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Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising
Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
A Hierarchical Analysist
ALAN D. HORNSTEIN*
The judicial power of the United States extends to cases "arising under"
federal law.1 Despite this deceptively simple formula two centuries of
judicial interpretation and reinterpretation have left the contours of this
category of federal judicial power problematic.' Although a variety of tests
has been suggested for determining what cases arise under federal law,'
none has been satisfactory.
f Copyright 1982 by Alan D. Hornstein. All rights reserved.
* J.D. 1970, Rutgers University School of Law (Newark). Associate Professor of Law,
University of Maryland. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Catherine Ed-
wards for her extraordinarily able assistance in the preparation of this article.
' U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 1.
2 E.g., D. CURRIE. FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 101 (1976).
1 Various tests have been proposed, the first of which was Chief Justice Marshall's federal
ingredient test. See notes 73-82 & accompanying text infra. It has been applied only
sporadically. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Pacific
R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); Kansas Pac. R.R. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 112
U.S. 414 (1884); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). A distinction, seldom
recognized in cases in which Chief Justice Marshall's test was applied, is that "arising under"
may have a different and broader meaning in the Constitution, which Chief Justice Mar-
shall was construing, than in the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). See note
9 infra; ef. note 86 infra (statutory basis of jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
Another formulation, taken from the language of the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18
Stat. 470, is that a case must "really and substantially" involve a dispute or controversy
over federal law. It is not clear what the test comprises, or, indeed, whether it is a test
at all as opposed to being merely a qualification of some unarticulated general principle.
It appears to have begun as the latter and become the former. Until about the turn of this
century the Supreme Court dismissed cases under the "really and substantially" formula-
tion when, although a plaintiff asserted a case arising under the federal law, his claim was
seen to be frivolous. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 65-66 (1904);
Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561 (1904); cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369
U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam) (three-judge court not required if constitutional question is in-
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Because litigants should not be subjected to protracted litigation merely
to determine the proper forum for adjudicating their rights, a coherent
theory of the arising under jurisdiction of the federal courts is necessary.
Few questions in American jurisprudence, however, are as bound up in
principles of federalism as is the question of the appropriate limits on the
power of federal courts," and, as a result, any proposed theory must take
into account the balance of power between the federal government and
the states.
A sound theory of arising under jurisdiction must reflect the constitu-
tional purposes underlying this jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments in cases arising under federal law
provides an authoritative tribunal whose decisions are binding on state
and lower federal courts, thereby assuring uniformity. The Court,
however, shares with the federal courts of original jurisdiction an addi-
tional function:' the protection of federal interests from state hostility,
substantial); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (same). The "really and substantially" for-
mulation is still used in this sense, see, e.g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (three-
judge court not required if constitutional question is insubstantial), although whether substan-
tiality is a proper ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction has been questioned, see Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974) (same); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970)
(same); cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam) (three-judge court not required
where defense that statute not unconstitutional is frivolous).
As a test of exclusion from federal judicial power, at least, the elements looked towards
are whether the claims involved are substantial and whether there is an actual dispute.
Although the test has been applied to foreclose consideration of cases in which the asserted
federal claim was frivolous or insubstantial, this may have been another way of saying there
was no real dispute over the federal issue, see, e.g., Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915),
or, more problematically, it may have been a way of saying that the resolution of the federal
issue was so well-established as to be beyond dispute, see, e.g., Levering & Garrigues Co.
v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub'g Co., 237 U.S. 618
(1915). It has also been used in those cases in which the federal issue was not actually
disputed. See, e.g., Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912) (where it was less than clear
that the right was disputed). But see The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22
(1913) (defendant disputed nothing because it defaulted). Justice Holmes proposed in American
Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), that a suit arises under the
law that "created the cause of action." Id. at 260. That "test," too, has served more as a
rule of exclusion than as a standard for inclusion. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974) (per curiam).
A final formulation for determining whether a case arises under federal law asks whether
the question of federal law is "basic" or "necessary" to the decision of the case. Gully v.
First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). Gully purportedly only synthesizes or
reframes the traditional requirements for jurisdiction, and the test propounded seems to
be a federal right test, id. at 114-16, with an overlay of the "really and substantially" for-
mulation, id. at 114. See notes 88-99 & accompanying text infra.
' See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 80-82 (A. Hamilton). Compare note 6 infra (purpose of
federal judiciary) with note 243 infra (purpose of limits on federal judicial power).
The source of both forms of jurisdiction is article III of the Constitution, which does
not distinguish cases arising under federal law in the context of-appellate review from those
arising under federal law for purposes of original jurisdiction. Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. 590, 620 (1875); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,820-21 (1824); see
Aycock, Introduction to Certain Members of the Federal Question Family, 49 N.C. L. REV.
1, 1 (1970); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362,362-63 (1942);
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 163 (1953).
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provincialism and error.
The constitutional grant of power must be broad enough to permit Con-
gress to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts when it perceives a need
for such protection.7 Congress may then be left to adjust the jurisdiction
to reflect that need.' Thus, a relatively broad reading of the constitutional
language is necessary to achieve its purpose.' Congress may narrow the
scope of federal judicial power to reflect changing needs. At the same time,
the constitutional limitations on the power of the federal courts, desig-
ed to safeguard the legitimate sovereignty interests of the states, demand
recognition." The search is for the appropriate balance between these
needs.
A case does not arise under federal law within the meaning of article
III unless a federal interest may be defeated by an erroneous adjudica-
tion. The problem is to identify cases in which the exercise of federal
judicial power may be necessary to protect federal interests. The purpose
of this article is to provide an approach, applicable to Supreme Court
review of state court judgments as well as to the original jurisdiction of
the federal courts, to guide that inquiry. This approach is based upon a
structural analysis of the elements of a case. All cases share certain
analytic elements, including jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties, capacity of the parties, the claim and the defense. A more refined
analysis discloses several subelements; a claim, for example, may involve
demonstrating the source, existence and breach of duty, causation and
injury. The law, federal or nonfederal, determines the necessary elements
of a particular case. When federal law governs an element it reflects a
' See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 509-10 (A.
Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961); J. MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 72 (A. Koch ed. 1966) (Madison, on the need for inferior federal courts, in debate
in Committee of the Whole); id. at 319 (Randolph, on the need for inferior courts: "Courts
of the States cannot be trusted with the administration of the National laws").
I Cases not within article III cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
-' Legislative authorization has been held necessary to vest the lower federal courts with
jurisdiction of cases within article I. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02
(1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.
226, 233-34 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). With one shortlived exception, see Midnight Judges Act, ch.
4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed 1802), it was not until 1875 that Congress authorized original
jurisdiction over cases arising under fedeial law, Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18
Stat. 470.
Although the current statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1331 (1976), and the relevant phrase in article
III are in haec verba, the statute has been construed more narrowly. Consequently, not all
cases that could be brought within the constitutionally permissible arising under jurisdic-
tion have been brought. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379
n.51 (1959); see, e.g., note 218 infra (declaratory judgments); notes 233-34 infra (federal
defenses).
' Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("lIlt is
a constitution we are expounding:').
,o See note 243 infra.
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federal concern; when state law governs an element it reflects state con-
cern and a corresponding absence of federal interest. In many cases, some
elements will be governed by federal law and others by nonfederal law.
These are the cases which present problems of arising under jurisdiction.
The relationships among these elements, and between each of them and
the case, form the case's structure. This structure is hierarchical; some
elements analytically antecede others. These antecedent elements must
be addressed before one proceeds further through the hierarchy.
The theory of this article is that the existence of arising under jurisdic-
tion depends upon whether the federal element of the case is sufficiently
anterior to other elements so that reliance on it will be necessary to
resolve the dispute. The federal interest relied upon to confer jurisdic-
tion must appear to be analytically antecedent to other elements at the
time the jurisdictional determination is made. The exercise of original
jurisdiction requires the presence of federal matter in the case at its
outset, while the exercise of appellate jurisdiction requires the emergence
of determinative issues of federal concern by the time review is sought.
Both, however, require that the federal element in the case be present
at a level in the analytic hierarchy which the court must reach in dispos-
ing of the case.
After adumbrating this theory in the context of the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court over state court judgments" and the original
jurisdiction of the federal district courts, 2 the article examines two par-
ticular problems of arising under jurisdiction-the abstention doctrine"1
and the well-pleaded complaint rule" -to demonstrate that the difficulties
in resolving the jurisdictional questions in both instances result from the
premature invocation of federal judicial power. The invocation of this
power is premature because the federal element is merely potential and
thus it is uncertain whether it will be necessary for decision of the case.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND THE NONFEDERAL GROUND
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee's established the Supreme Court's power to
review state court determinations of questions of federal law.", When a
" See notes 15-66 & accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 67-139 & accompanying text infra.
'" See notes 140-214 & accompanying text infra.
"' See notes 215-67 & accompanying text infra.
" 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
1 The first expression of this proposition seems to have been in Owings v. Norwood's
Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809). More developed expressions are found in McKin-
ney v. Carroll, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 66, 68 (1838); McBride v. Hoey's Lessee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
167, 172 (1837); Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 117, 127 (1827); and Matthews v.
Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164, 206 & n.9 (1820). Justice Taney restated the proposition in
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). The proposition was not accepted uncritically.
See, e.g., Warren, Legislatve and Judiciai Attacks on The Supreme Court of the United States-
[Vol. 56:563
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state court has decided a case on both federal and state law grounds, the
Court may review the former but not the latter determination.' 7 When
review of the federal determination cannot affect the outcome of the
case-that is, when the state court's determination is said to rest on an
adequate and independent state ground-the Court lacks power to review
the determination of federal law, 8 for the case could not then be one aris-
ing under federal law.
A History of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 161 (1913). For
discussion of this issue, see R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES S 52, at 90 n.1 (2d ed. R. Wolfson & P. Kurland 1951); R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICES 3.31 (4th ed. 1969); 16C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER
& E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 4019 (1977).
" The doctrine predates Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Given Erie, however,
it follows that the Supreme Court is without power to review the judgments of state courts
on questions of state law. Moreover, to the extent that Erie is constitutionally compelled,
it is doubtful whether Congress could confer such power on the Court. According to Erie,
"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State" whether declared by its legislatures or
by its highest court. Id. at 78. The Court is bound to accept the view of the state's highest
court on state law, and if the law has been expressed in the case before it reaches the Court,
there is scarcely room for "interpretation" of it. Cf. Note, Judicial Federalism: Rights of
the Accused in New Jersey, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 530,560-65 (1969) (state court "interpretation"
of Supreme Court decisions).
Thus, on questions of state law, the determination of the state court is final and bind-
ing. McBride v. Hoey's Lessee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 167, 172 (1837). Given the probable lack
of power in the Supreme Court to review findings of fact in such a case, see American Radio
Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 231 (1974); cf Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 463 (1976) (dictum) (findings of state courts normally accorded deference even when
Court reviewing constitutional claims); but of., e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960) (Supreme Court will review lower court judgments when due process questions
presented are substantial); Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order of Nobles of the Mystic Shrine
v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929) (limited review of findings concerning state law in some
circumstances); 16 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 16, at S 4033
(same, generally), such findings, too, would be insulated from the Court's appellate review,
but cf Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 461 ("Nothing in the Constitution requires that
assessment of fault in a civil case tried in a state court be made by a jury, nor is there
any prohibition against such a finding being made in the first instance by an appellate, rather
than a trial, court.").
" There were early hints of this doctrine in McKinney v. Carroll, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 66, 70
(1838), and Neilson v. Lagow, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 98, 110 (1851). It was applied and the earlier
cases discussed at some length in Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1871). One of
the most frequently cited cases is Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 635-36 (1875), in which
the Court took jurisdiction. The procedure in Murdock was to determine whether the federal
question was decided correctly and, if it was, to affirm; if the federal question was decided
incorrectly but the judgment rested on an adequate and independent ground the judgment
also was affirmed. The Court in Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893), established the cur-
rent practice of refusing to review the federal question when there was an adequate and
independent ground to support it. See generally R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, supra note 16,
at SS 89-103; R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN. supra note 16, at SS 3.31-.33; 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 16, at SS 4019, 4020.
The ground may be substantive, e.g., Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S.
487 (1965); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers
Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917), or procedural, e.g., Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972)
(per curiam); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., 355 U.S.
597 (1958) (per curiam); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
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A state court determination that a particular state action violates state
and federal constitutions, for example, is not reviewable by the Supreme
Court. Should the Court decide that the state court erred in its deter-
mination of the federal issue, it could not disturb the decision, for it lacks
power to review the resolution of the state constitutional question. A
Supreme Court opinion as to the federal constitutionality of the action
would be merely advisory because the state court's reliance on nonfederal
grounds rendered the federal question moot.19 The Court sits to correct
erroneous judgments based on federal law, 0 not to revise opinions of the
state courts.
In contrast, the Court may review a state court decision upholding a
challenged action as violating neither the state nor federal constitutions.
If the Court were to find the state court's resolution of the federal issue
erroneous, it would reverse; the nonfederal ground would not be adequate
to support the decision.2 Similarly, if the state court decides that the
challenged action violates the state constitution because it violates the
federal Constitution, the Court has held it has power to review the case.'
Presumably, once the state court's error in determining the federal issue
is explicated, it will reconsider its determination of the state issue that
depended upon the erroneous federal determination.' The state ground
for decision is not independent.2 4
19 Paschall v. Christie-Stewart, Inc., 414 U.S. 100, 102 (1973) (per curiam); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Mur-
dock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 634-35 (1875). See also Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 261-62
(1944).
20 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
21 New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Berea College .v. Kentucky,
211 U.S. 45 (1908); see Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Gibbes v. Zimmerman,
290 U.S. 326 (1933).
' United Airlines v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952); see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977);
Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); of. Jankovich v. Indiana Toll
Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965) (state constitutional grounds held adequate and indepen-
dent); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940) (federal constitutional issue not
reviewed); New York City v. Central Say. Bank, 306 U.S. 661 (1939) (per curiam) (state court
held that its interpretation of scope of state constitutional due process provision governed
even if it was not same as federal; held, state constitutional ground adequate and
independent).
E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485 (1942).
24 Such at least is the traditional analysis, though the cases are not entirely harmonious
and the principle is itself questionable. That the state may have chosen to be guided by
federal law in making its determination does not actually convert a state law question into
a federal one. Deciding the federal question under these circumstances is rendering an ad-
visory opinion on a question of federal law not before the Court so that a state court can
reconsider its own law in light of that opinion; in no real sense is the case one arising under
federal law. See State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939); Moore v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934); Flores v. Beto, 374 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1967)
(dictum). But see Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944). See generally Greene, Hybrid State
Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARv. L. REV. 289 (1969).
Similar problems concerning the appropriate treatment of cases in which state law in-
corporates federal law have arisen with respect to the exercise of original jurisdiction. Com-
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The relevant inquiry is the state court's actual ratio decidendi; the
possibility that some other ground could have formed the basis of deci-
sion is not relevant to appellate power in the Supreme Court. Thus, if
the state court bases its decision on federal grounds, the fact that it could
have based its decision on state law does not deprive the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction. In this limited sense the state court may be said to have
the power to confer jurisdiction on, or deny it to, the Supreme Court-a
power exercised by electing one ground of decision over another.
An example of this is found in Orr v. Orr which involved a challenge
to an Alabama statute providing that husbands, but not wives, could be
required to pay alimony.2 Mr. and Mrs. Orr were divorced in 1974. The
decree, which incorporated a stipulation between the parties, directed the
payment of alimony. Two years after the decree Mrs. Orr brought a con-
tempt proceeding against her former husband, alleging nonpayment. Mr.
Orr defended on the ground that the statute authorizing the award
violated the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment"
by discriminating on the basis of gender.'
The Alabama courts held the statute constitutional and entered judg-
ment against Mr. Orr on that basis," even though the case probably could
have been decided on state grounds. The Alabama courts could have found
the constitutional challenge untimely because it was not forthcoming when
the divorce decree, including the alimony provision, was issued, but only
after the initiation of contempt proceedings.3 Alternatively, the alimony
obligation may have arisen from the stipulation incorporated into the
divorce decree.3' To the extent that the obligation was based upon the
private contractual agreement of the parties, the unconstitutionality of
the alimony statutes would leave that obligation unimpaired.' Either basis
would have left the Supreme Court without power to review.' The
pare, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), with Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). See also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667 (1950) (incorporation of federal law in private contract).
440 U.S. 268 (1979). Subsequent to the Court's decision holding the statute unconstitu-
tional on equal protection grounds, the Alabama courts reinterpreted the statute to ex-
tend benefits to husbands as well as wives and, as so interpreted, applied it to Mr. Orr.
Orr v. Orr, 374 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1060 (1980).
2, ALA. CODE SS 30-2-51 to -52 (1975) (amended 1979); id. S 30-2-53 (repealed 1979).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
2 440 U.S. at 271.
, 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. quashed as improvidently granted, 351 So. 2d 906
(Ala. 1977).
440 U.S. at 274, 275 n.4 (citing Hughes v. Hughes, 362 So. 2d 910 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted. 362 So. 2d 918 (Ala. 1978)); cf. Herndon v. Georgia, 295
U.S. 441 (1935) (petition for rehearing too late to raise federal question).
31 440 U.S. at 275.
= See Simon v. Eastern Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
1 E.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 549-53 (1962) (failure to preserve federal ques-.
tion in state appellate court operates as waiver); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358-59
(1953) (same); see Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); notes 18-20 & accompanying
text supra. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS S 107, at 541-43 (3d ed. 1976).
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Alabama courts, however, did not rely on either of these nonfederal
grounds; the only issue the state courts considered was the constitution-
ality vel non of the alimony statutes.'
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the state courts had
decided the federal question without considering any state law issues, and
held that the Court had jurisdiction to review:
"Where the state court does not decide against a petitioner or appellant
upon an independent state ground, but deeming the federal question
to be before it, actually entertains and decides that question adverse-
ly to the federal right asserted, this Court has jurisdiction to review
the judgment if, as here, it is a final judgment. We cannot refusejurisdiction because the state court might have based its decision, con-
sistently with the record, upon an independent and adequate non-
federal ground."'
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the petitioner lacked
standing 6 because, if the equal protection challenge were to be viewed
as based upon the unconstitutional burden appellant allegedly bore under
it, the parties' stipulation precluded finding the necessary causal nexus
between the statute and Mr. Orr's injury. 7
Justices Brennan8 and Rehnquist" agreed that the appellant's obliga-
tion might continue without regard to the constitutionality of the alimony
statute; it might well be binding upon him as a matter of state contract
law. 0 Their disagreement focused upon the effect of this "might" upon
the Court's power to adjudicate the constitutional issue. The majority
treated the state law issue as one "which we cannot and would not
predict."'" Justice Rehnquist reasoned that so long as the appellant's
1 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. quashed as improvidently granted, 351 So. 2d 906
(Ala. 1977).
440 U.S. at 276-77 (quoting Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938)).
440 U.S. at 290-300 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 296-97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also stated that if the equal
protection challenge were viewed as based upon the unconstitutional withholding from men
of the benefit of receiving alimony, standing would necessitate that the party "be in line
to receive the benefit if the suit is successful" Id. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It was
undisputed that appellant in no event would be entitled to an award of alimony and hence
"[was] not in a position to benefit from a sex-neutral alimony statute." Id. at 295 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 275 & n.5 (majority opinion).
Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40 It is important to bear in mind during the ensuing discussion that Orr is not a case
in which review of an alimony award under a statute which was allegedly unconstitutional
was sought; rather, the Court was asked to review a judgment of contempt based upon
appellant's failure to obey the direction of the Alabama court that he pay alimony. Moreover,
as has been noted, see text accompanying note 31 supra, that decree may itself have been
based upon a stipulation of the parties. Consequently, the issues of state law which might
remain open if the statute were held unconstitutional were unclear. 440 U.S. at 275 n.5;
cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (contempt conviction for failure
to obey order beyond court's jurisdiction upheld).
" 440 U.S. at 275 n.5.
[Vol. 56:563
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obligation might be enforced without regard to the statute, his standing
to challenge that statute had not been established, and that because the
appellant bore the burden of establishing that the injury was the result
of the statute or that the requested relief would remove the harm, the
failure to carry that burden was fatal to the Court's jurisdiction. 2
Moreover, the parties' failure to raise, and the state courts' failure to con-
sider, nonfederal grounds did not cure the jurisdictional defect, which was
the existence vel non of nonfederal grounds for the appellant's obligation
and the possibility that he lacked standing to litigate the federal issue. 3
If the state courts had determined that there was no ground other than
the challenged statute upon which appellant's obligation could be based,
standing would have existed. To suggest, as the Court did," that the
obligation to pay alimony might continue regardless of the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute is to treat the legal issues out of context. If both
state and federal bases of a right are claimed, a judgment supporting the
right may be based on either. If one is asserted and the other not, only
the one asserted may be relied upon; if it is insufficient, the claimed right
ought not to be upheld. Given that a party cannot be compelled to assert
a particular theory of the case,' 5 if the failure to assert a claim or right
in a timely manner and in the appropriate context bars its later assertion, 6
a court may not rest its decision on grounds not raised by the parties.
"Id- at 296-97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. note 128 infra (original jurisdiction).
440 U.S. at 299 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In support of this proposition, Justice Rehn-
quist relied upon Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In that case, despite a
state court ruling on the merits, the Court dismissed an appeal on the ground that a tax-
payer lacked the requisite financial stake in the litigation to have standing to sue. Justice
Rehnquist's reliance on Doremus was misplaced because in the instant case if appellant lacked
standing it was as the result of state law which rendered the federal determination merely
advisory. Only through the most strained construction can this be characterized as "a state
court ... transform[ing] an abstract or hypothetical question into a 'case or controversy,'
440 U.S. at 299 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The standing problem in Orr was the existence
vel non of nonfederal grounds on which the appellant's obligation might rest despite the
failure of the parties or the state courts to consider them. In Doremus, by contrast, the
jurisdictional defect was independent of state law and had nothing to do with the grounds
of the decision being reviewed.
" 440 U.S. at 275-76 & n.5, 283-84.
" Cf. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979) (court may not compel defense
of insanity by one who intelligently rejects it). See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970).
"1 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS SS 45, 47, 48 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS SS 45-48 (1942). Perhaps the most obvious example is the bar-
ring of a claim by the running of an applicable statute of limitations, but other examples
abound. E.g., Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91 (1955); Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948); Richardson Mach. Co. v. Scott,
276 U.S. 128 (1928); cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (remanded for considera-
tion whether failure to make timely objection to admission of evidence was knowing waiver).
But see NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); Rogers
v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e), 12(h), 13(a); FED. R. EVID. 103(a);
notes 50, 244-46 & accompanying text infra.
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To paraphrase Justice Rehnquist, courts are not commissioned to roam
at large, vindicating unclaimed rights.' Thus, in a suit for alimony in which
the only defense raised is the unconstitutionality of the statute authoriz-
ing the award, the failure of that defense should leave the defendant liable
even if some other defense might have been raised.48
The theory underlying the Supreme Court's lack of power to review
a state court judgment resting on adequate and independent nonfederal
grounds is that the federal case has been mooted by the state judgment,
and a Supreme Court decision would constitute an advisory opinion. At
least in the absence of collusion to create jurisdiction,49 however, parties
may concede or stipulate that liability is entirely dependent upon the
resolution of a single question, thereby waiving all other claims or
defenses. It is difficult, then, to see how resolution of the only remain-
ing issue can call for an advisory opinion. As a matter of policy, the ra-
tionale underlying the case or controversy requirement, the presence of
a concrete and adverse stake in the outcome sufficient to assure full argu-
ment and presentation of the case51 is likely to be satisfied when a party
has placed all his eggs in the federal basket. That there may have been
nonfederal grounds available is not relevant so long as they are not
available at the time the Court is called upon to review a state court
decision52 resting exclusively on federal grounds. If a party waives all
nonfederal grounds by failing to assert them, the alternative grounds are
foreclosed just as though they had been asserted and determined adverse-
ly to the claimant." As a general rule, even after a reversal and remand
such nonfederal grounds will be unavailable because of the failure to raise
them in the prior state adjudication.Y
" 440 U.S. at 299 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., notes 46 supra, 50 infra. For a caveat because the Orr court was reviewing
a contempt judgment, see note 40 supra.
41 See 440 U.S. at 288 n.3, 289 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 36; ef. Elfman Motors v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252,1254 (3d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (discussing court's jurisdiction upon appeal); Spound v. Mohasco In-
dus., Inc., 534 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976) (same); Scaramucci
v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 427 F.2d 1309, 1318 (10th Cir. 1970) (same); note 46 supra (failure
timely to assert claim, right or defense may bar later assertion); note 247 infra (admission
or stipulation of facts on which jurisdiction depends).
51 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see Cutler v. Rae, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 729,
733 (1849) (Wayne, J., dissenting). See generally Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 1002 (1924).
' Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963) (habeas corpus exhaustion requirement ap-
plies only to state remedies still available at time of petition).
See note 46 supra.
' Thus, for example, with respect to the state law issue of the timeliness of appellant's
constitutional claim, the majority noted, "This does not preclude any other State, or even
Alabama in another case, from holding that contempt proceedings are too late in the pro-
cess to challenge the constitutionality of a divorce decree already entered without constitu-
tional objection .... " 440 U.S. at 275 n.4 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court found
it permissible for the Alabama courts to consider on remand the effect under state law
of Mr. Orr's stipulated agreement to pay alimony. Id. at 283-84. The distinction is problematic.
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Similarly, to suggest, as Justice Powell did in Orr, that the Court should
"abstain from reaching ... the constitutional questions at the present
time"55 is to misconceive the relationship between the federal issue that
the Court is called upon to decide and whatever state law grounds might
once have been relied upon to avoid the necessity of that decision. As the
majority noted, the abstention doctrine is inapplicable in those situations
in which "the state court to be deferred to has ... previously examined
the case."' Abstention would allow the litigant an opportunity to litigate
state law grounds for relief which he or she failed to assert in the initial
state proceeding. The difficulty with Justice Powell's position is that the
state court to which he would defer has-albeit implicitly- already deter-
mined the nonfederal issues adversely to the party seeking review.
Something akin to abstention is appropriate only when the decision is
ambiguous with respect to the grounds on which relief was granted or
denied. In such cases, it is the determination of the state court in that
case that requires elucidation. When it is unclear whether the state court's
decision rests on adequate and independent nonfederal grounds,57 and
hence whether the Supreme Court possesses the power to review, the
Court may take any of several approaches. It may dismiss for want of
jurisdiction because the decision below might rest upon adequate and in-
dependent nonfederal grounds;' it may grant review because the deci-
sion below might not rest upon adequate and independent nonfederal
grounds;" it may retain the case and seek the state court's clarification
of the basis of its decision;6 or it may vacate the judgment rendered below
Id. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 278 n.8 (majority opinion).
51 The most obvious difficulty occurs in cases in which the state court has issued no opin-
ion, e.g., Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946);
Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934); Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (1907);
Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300 (1890), but even if an opinion is issued, the grounds for deci-
sion may not be clear, e.g., Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973); Califor-
nia v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); Department of Mental Health v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194
(1965); notes 58-61 infra.
11 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956);
Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948); Woods v.
Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Woolsey v. Best,
299 U.S. 1 (1936); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934); Bachtel v. Wilson,
204 U.S. 36 (1907); Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300 (1890).
"' Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945);
Neilson v. Lagow, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 98 (1851); C. WRIGHT. supra note 33, S 107, at 547-48.
In Williams and Neilson, in which the state grounds were unclear, the Court refused to
find "untenable" (that is, wrong) state grounds by implication. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
at 478; Neilson v. Lagow, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 110-11. The Court in Konigsberg may have
been doing the same thing, but its language is similar to that in those cases in which state
procedural grounds have been found inadequate to support the judgment. At least arguably
within this category are the compulsion-of-federal-law cases such as Perkins v. Benguet Con-
sol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), in which the state ground might not have been
independent.
" Lynumn v. Illinois, 368 U.S. 908 (1961); Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952); Loftus v.
Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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and remand for clarification. 1 One leading scholar has been able to discern
no pattern with respect to the approach the Court has adopted in past
cases.
62
The Supreme Court may decide whether the appealed decision rests
on federal or nonfederal grounds.6 Such a decision would rest on the
Court's interpretation of the basis of the state court's decision. That the
Court may do so does not suggest that it must or even that it should.
As Justice Jackson said: "[Ilt seems consistent with the respect due the
highest courts of states of the Union that they be asked rather than told
what they have intended."" Apart from "respect," it would be more sen-
sible, in terms of arriving at a correct result, for the court rendering a
decision to determine its basis than for some other court to do so.65 The
possibility that the state court's ambiguous decision rests on a nonfederal
" Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978) (per curiam); Ohio v.
Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257 (1976) (per curiam); Paschall v. Christie-Stewart, Inc., 414 U.S. 100
(1973) (per curiam); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); Honeyman v. Hanan,
300 U.S. 14 (1937).
62 C. WRIGHT, supra, note 33, § 107, at 548; 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E.
GRESSMAN, supra note 16, S 4032, at 769; see Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court
Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous Grounds of Decision, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 822, 842, 847 (1962).
' Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 298 (1956); Lovell v. Griffith, 303 U.S. 444,
450 (1938); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98-99 (1938); Honeyman v. Hanan,
300 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1937). In addition, in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959), a federal habeas
case, the Court decided the state court decision was based on constitutional grounds although
the state court discussed state and federal issues and specifically stated its decision of the
federal issue was not necessary.
The Supreme Court decides for itself whether the ground, if nonfederal, is adequate and
independent. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364
U.S. 177, 186 (1960); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1958); Honeyman v. Hanan,
300 U.S. 14, 18-19, 23 (1937); Lawrence v. State-Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 282 (1932); Abie
State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931); Broad River Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S.
537, 540 (1931); see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566-68 (1977)
(independence); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 297 (1964) (adequacy); Ward v. Love
County, 253 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920) (adequacy); Miller's Examiners v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132,
136-37 (1893) (independence); cf. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 583 (1969) (Court decides
for itself whether a contention as to federal law was raised in state court); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (same); Schuykill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U.S. 113
(1935) (same).
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945).
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), held the federal courts were
without power under the anti-injunction statute, Judicial Code, ch. 231, S 265, 36 Stat. 1162
(1911) (amended 1948), to enjoin relitigation in state courts of matters settled in prior ac-
tions in federal courts. In 1948 the statute was amended to permit injunctions by the federal
courts "to protect or effectuate its judgments," Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 155, 62 Stat. 968
(codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2283 (1976)). According to the reviser's notes, the only legislative
history of the provision, P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER. HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1237 (2d ed. 1973), the phrase was
intended to overrule Toucey. 28 U.S.C. S 2283 note (1976). Under'the amended statute a
federal court which has determined a case is not barred from enjoining relitigation in state
court. E.g., Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1950). One advantage of the
revision is that it enables the deciding court to determine what was decided-that is, whether
res judicata is to be applied to the subsequent state proceedings. Perhaps unfortunately,
the scheme is not the same with respect to state court power to enjoin relitigation in federal
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ground may be sufficient for the Court to postpone decision until its
jurisdiction is affirmatively demonstrated. Prior to that time the asser-
tion of jurisdiction would be premature because it would be uncertain
whether the case was one arising under federal law.68
OSBORN, ORIGINAL JURISDICTION AND THE POTENTIAL
NONFEDERAL GROUND
Although the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases
arising under federal law- either originally or on review of a state court
judgment-the differences between original and appellate jurisdiction and
the different statutory bases on which they rest 7 require that the test
for determining the existence of the jurisdiction be applied differently in
the two contexts." For appellate review of state court judgments it is suf-
ficient that some question of federal law be presented, the answer to which
may affect the outcome of the case. 9 The jurisdiction, however, extends
court. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1978); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408 (1964). See generally Hornstein & Nagle, State Court Power to Enjoin Federal Judicial
Proceedings: Donovan v. City of Dallas Revisited, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1981).
"See notes 268-70 & accompanying text infra. The Court has on occasion specifically
avoided difficult jurisdictional questions, ruling on the merits in favor of the party prevail-
ing below. In Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976), in which the jurisdictional question
was whether a three-judge panel was properly convened, the Court examined the results
if jurisdiction were sustained and the merits reached and if the appeal were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and concluded:
It thus is evident that, whichever disposition we undertake, the effect is the
same. It follows that there is no need to decide the theoretical question ofjurisdiction in this case. In the past, we similarly have reserved difficult ques-
tions of our jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the
merits in favor of the same party.... Although such a disposition would not
be desirable under all circumstances, we perceive no reason why we may not
so proceed in this case where the merits have been rendered plainly
insubstantial.
Id. at 532 (citations omitted). See also Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974)
(per curiam) (jurisdictional question whether statutory provision that decisions of courts-
martial are final and not reviewable except by military appeals courts precluded district
court challenge to constitutionality of section of Code of Military Justice under which plaintiff
was convicted by court-martial); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969) (Court
of Claims jurisdiction over suit for back pay challenged on similar basis). But cf. Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (court of appeals in diversity case should have decided
preliminary state question before reaching constitutional question).
" The Supreme Court's power to review the judgments of state courts is given by 28
U.S.C. S 1257 (1976). The original jurisdiction of the federal courts over cases arising under
federal law is conferred by id. S 1331, although many statutes also confer original jurisdic-
tion over more specialized subject matter, see, e.g., id. S 1337 (commerce and antitrust); id.
S 1338 (patent, copyright, trademark); id. S 1339 (postal matters); id. S 1343 (civil rights).
"See generally Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under," 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978,989-90
(1979).
" See, e.g., Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U.S. 14, 18 (1937); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87
U.S. 590, 630-31, 635 (1875); 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER. E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra note
16, S 4006; notes 18-20 supra (basis of "adequate and independent" state ground notion is
that answer to federal question does not, or need not, affect outcome of case).
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no further than to that federal question.10 The presence of some federal
ingredient or issue of federal law is not sufficient to confer original federal
jurisdiction. 1 In this sense, original jurisdiction is narrower than appellate
jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction extends, however, not only to the federal
issue, but to the entire cause.' In this sense, original jurisdiction is broader
than appellate jurisdiction.
The first significant judicial examination of the original arising under
jurisdiction was Osborn v. Bank of the United States.' Subsequent analyses
are rooted in the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall for the Court and of
Justice Johnson in dissent.
At the very least, invocation of the arising under jurisdiction re-
quires "that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated
by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United States,
and sustained by the opposite construction." 4 Chief Justice Marshall's
"federal ingredient" test" is uniformly recognized as the fullest per-
missible extension of federal judicial power. 8 Upon closer analysis,
" E.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
590, 630-31 (1875); see Note, Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions Involving Multi-
ple Questions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 764, 767 (1947).
71 E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974) (per curiam); Gully v.
First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908). But see Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Pacific R.R.
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884); Note, supra note
68. See also Mishkin, supra note 5, at 162-63.
Original jurisdiction extends to the entire cause in two senses. The district court has
long been said to have jurisdiction to decide questions of state law necessarily involved
in the decision of the federal question, The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824), and it has jurisdic-
tion to decide state law claims related to the federal claim. The latter application was
recognized from a fairly early date in the situation in which a state statute was challenged
alternatively on state grounds and federal constitutional grounds. E.g., Hopkins v. Southern
Cal. Tel. Co., 275 U.S. 393, 399 (1928); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175,191-92 (1909).
The federal court also has jurisdiction when there is a related state law claim arising
from the same set of circumstances that give rise to the federal claim, United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); ef. Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528 (1974) (three-judge court has jurisdiction over statutory claim related to con-
stitutional claim), although the test for determining whether the state law claim is suffi-
ciently related to the federal for there to be jurisdiction has changed, compare United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, with Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. at 245-46. See generally
note 113 infra.
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
' Id. at 822.
1 ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 482-83
(1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]; 1 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.62 [2.-i] (2d ed. 1981);
Aycock, supra note 5, at 28-31; London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a
Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835,837-38,842-43 (1959); see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514-15 (1969); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 471
(1884); Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 141 (1880); 1 J. MOORE. supra note 75, 0.62
[2.-]; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. S 3562, at
398402 (1975 & Supp. 1980); Aycock, supra note 5, at 25-28; Cohen, The Broken Compass:
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however, Osbojtn77 does not stand for so broad a proposition; 8 on
the facts of the case, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion does not necessari-
ly preclude the destruction of jurisdiction by the presence of nonfederal
issues. At issue in Osborn were the rights of the Bank of the United
States under a contract. The bank was wholly a creature of federal
law. Its existence and capacity to enter contracts and to sue and
be sued were entirely dependent on federal law. The argument against
jurisdiction was that unless the federal law that created the bank
and granted it its power was challenged, no question of federal law
was presented and the case could not be one arising under the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall observed that the mere presence of nonfederal
issues could not be enough to deprive the national courts of jurisdiction.79
Justice Johnson, who dissented, agreed with the Chief Justice on this
point.' Chief Justice Marshall then declared that, apart from those cases
over which the Supreme Court is given original jurisdiction by the Con-
stitution, there are no cases over which the Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction that are constitutionally precluded from being heard originally
in the inferior federal courts." Here, too, Justice Johnson agreed.2 The
two jurists differed in the application of these principles to the case of
the bank.
The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890,
891 (1967); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Pt. I, 36 U. CHL
L. REv. 268, 268-69 (1969); Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TUL. L.
REV. 263,265-66 (1943); London, supra note 75, at 837-39; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 160-63; see
Chadbourn & Levine, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639,
648-50, 651-52 & passim (1942); Note, supra note 68.
" Much of the discussion and analysis engaged in Osborn was inapplicable to that case.
The bank's suit to enjoin enforcement of a state tax on federal constitutional grounds was,
under any rational approach, a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. The Osborn analyses were applied to the problem discussed in the text in a compa-
nion case, Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), in
which recovery was sought on negotiable notes made by a state bank. Here the conven-
tional, though historically inaccurate, style is used to avoid confusion.
," Osborn is hardly unique among Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in being read more
expansively than might be required by the issue before the Court, perhaps because of the
legendary stature of the Chief Justice. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806) (interpreted to require complete diversity whether parties' interests are joint
or several despite opinion's express limitation to joint interests); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (read as standing for broad power of judicial review although
it is not impermissible to find Marbury determining only power of Court to strike down
legislation aimed at judicial branch and requiring that branch to do that which Constitu-
tion prohibits); 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1007 (1953) (judicial review limited to "judiciary prerogatives"). See generally Strong,
Bicentennial Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitutional Processes, 55 N.C. L.
REV. 1 (1976).
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819-20.
Id. at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 820 (majority opinion).
Id. at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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Justice Johnson's view was that arising under jurisdiction requires that
an issue of federal law be raised and litigated. Such jurisdiction could not
attach to a case simply on the basis of plaintiff's complaint unless all the
elements necessary to sustain the case were federal. In any other instance
an assertion of federal law might or might not be disputed by the defen-
dant. Consequently, any case in which one or more elements of plaintiffs
claim rested on nonfederal ground could not be brought within the original
arising under jurisdiction except by removal after it appeared that the
parties were joining issue on a matter of federal law.'
In contemporary terms, Justice Johnson's position was as follows: The
case could have been brought in state court. If it had been, it would have
been possible for the state court to decide the federal issue in favor of
the bank, and still to decide that, as a matter of state contract law, the
bank would not be entitled to recover. It might also be possible for the
federal issue not to be raised and for the state court to hold against the
bank as a matter of state contract law. In either event, the adequate and
independent state ground would insulate the state court's decision from
Supreme Court review."
Thus, if Congress may vest the inferior federal courts with original
jurisdiction to hear only cases over which the Supreme Court might ex-
ercise appellate jurisdiction, it would be improper, in Justice Johnson's
view, for a federal court of original jurisdiction to entertain a case unless
some issue dependent on federal law was actually to be litigated, for only
in that instance could the Supreme Court exercise appellate power:
The argument [of counsel for appellant] went to deny the right to
assume jurisdiction on a mere hypothesis .... [U]ntil a question in-
volving the construction or administration of the laws of the United
States did actually arise, the casusfederis was not presented, on which
the constitution authorized the government to take to itself thejurisdiction of the cause. That until such a question actually arose, until
such a case was actually presented, non constat, but the cause depended
upon general principles, exclusively cognizable in the State Court ....
And this doctrine has my hearty concurrence in its general
application."
On the facts in Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall was correct in holding
the exercise of original federal jurisdiction within the power conferred
on the federal judiciary by article III.' A proper application of Justice
Id. at 885-89 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
But see Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932) (where the nonfederal ground
is not substantial it will not preclude review); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931)
(same); Ward v. Board of Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (same); cf. Indiana ex rel. Anderson
v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (discussed in note 118 infra).
'5 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 884-85 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
It is less clear whether Chief Justice Marshall was correct in his view of the statutory
basis of jurisdiction. The Court held that the Act of Congress incorporating the bank, Act
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Johnson's position is limited to those situations in which it is possible to
decide a case without relying-either explicitly or by necessary
implication-on federal law. The elusive distinction is between those cases
in which a federal ground of decision must exist and those cases in which
it might exist. With respect to those cases that are incapable of being
decided without the resolution or application of federal law the Chief
Justice was correct; with respect to those cases in which, although it may
become necessary to determine or apply federal law, the necessity is not
present at the outset, federal jurisdiction exists coextensively with the
federal ground. Osborn could not have been decided without reliance on
the federal matter because the federal elements were analytically antece-
dent to all other issues in the case.
As Chief Justice Marshall analyzed it:
When a Bank sues, thefirst question which presents itself, and which
lies at the foundation of the cause, is, has this legal entity a right to
sue? Has it a right to come, not into this Court particularly, but into
any Court? This depends on a law of the United States. The next ques-
tion is, has this being a right to make this particular contract? If this
question be decided in the negative, the cause is determined against
the plaintiff; and this question, too, depends entirely on a law of the
United States .... [Tihe question respecting the right to make a par-
ticular contract, or to acquire a particular property, or to sue on ac-
count of a particular injury, belongs to every particular case, and may
be renewed in every case. The question forms an original ingredient
in every cause. Whether it be in fact relied on or not, in the defence
it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied on. The right of the
plaintiff to sue cannot depend on the defence which the defendant may
choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defence, and must
depend on the state of things when the action is brought. The ques-
tion which the case involves, then, must determine its character,
whether those questions be made in the cause or not.
... [T]he validity of the contract [in this case] depends on a law of
the United States .... The act of Congress is its foundation. The con-
tract could never have been made, but under the authority of that act.
The act itself is the first ingredient in the case, is its origin, is that from
which every other part arises.'
The analysis may be illustrated by Gully v. First National Bank in
Meridian.' Gully was a suit by the state tax collector of Mississippi to
of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266, conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts over suits
in which the bank was a party by making it capable "to sue and be sued ... in any circuit
court of the United States." Id. S 7, at 269. An earlier case, United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85 (1809), involving the first bank, had interpreted similar language as
giving only legal capacity to the bank rather than jurisdiction to the federal courts. Deveaux
was distinguished on the ground that the act incorporating the first bank made it capable
of "suing or being sued" in any court while the act incorporating the second bank was more
"particular" in mentioning specifically state and federal courts. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 817-18.
See Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 U.S. 295 (1916).
' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823-25 (emphasis added).
" 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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recover state, county and municipal taxes claimed to be owed by the
respondent pursuant to an agreement between it and its predecessor in
interest, a national banking association. The respondent was the grantee
of the assets of the insolvent First National Bank of Meridian under a
contract whereby it assumed the liabilities of its grantor. Alleged to be
among those liabilities were taxes assessed against its grantor. 9
State taxation of national banking associations was governed by federal
statute;' in the absence of a permissive statute the tax would have violated
the principle of McCulloch v. Maryland." The question presented to the
Court in Gully was whether the case arose under the statute permitting
the state to tax the bank. The district court and the court of appeals had
sustained federal jurisdiction.' After reviewing the various tests that had
been suggested for determining the existence of federal judicial power,93
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that it had no jurisdiction.'
Justice Cardozo's analysis is consistent with the views expressed by
Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn. Both the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court recognized that the existence of jurisdiction depended
upon "whether the plaintiff count[ed] upon a federal right in support of
his claim."95 The courts' mode of analysis was similar. The difference in
result was based upon whether the federal permissive statute was found
analytically anterior to the state's power to tax or whether the absence
of such a statute merely provided the bank with a federal defense to an
action to collect the tax. The court of appeals found that the statute was
"not a limitation placed by the federal laws upon an'antecedent right of
the state to tax national banks, so as to be considered only a weapon of
defense against such taxation.""8 Because the court of appeals found the
federal element in the case-the permissive statute-analytically anterior
to the state's power to tax, it upheld jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's reversal was based upon its view that the per-
missive statute, rather than being analytically antecedent to the state's
power to tax, was the renunciation of a defense that would have been
available in the absence of the statute. Thus, the federal statute was, in
Id. at 111.
o Act of March 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223 (current version at 12 U.S.C. S 548 (1976).
9' 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
81 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1936); see 299 U.S. at 112.
'3 299 U.S. at 112-14; see note 3 supra.
9' The Court was quite plainly construing the statutory rather than the constitutional
basis of jurisdiction. 299 U.S. at 112. Indeed, Osborn was distinguished on this ground. Id.
at 113. As a statutory matter, it was not significant that the federal jurisdiction was in-
voked by the defendant through removal rather than by the plaintiff originally; as a mat-
ter of constitutional analysis, however, that procedural element is critical. See notes 232-37
& accompanying text infra.
95 299 U.S. at 115; see 81 F.2d at 505.
81 F.2d at 505.
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effect, two analytic steps from the basis of the suit." Before the statute
became relevant there would have to be an action for the tax and the con-
stitutional defense; the permissive statute could then be raised as a reply
to that defense. As was stated by Justice Cardozo: "A suit does not arise
under a law renouncing a defense."98
This analysis may furnish the answer to Justice Johnson's view that
Osborn would permit jurisdiction over contracts or deeds or wills to be
taken from the states and transferred to the federal courts. Justice
Johnson suggested that Osborn would permit Congress to confer federal
jurisdiction over suits involving documents required to bear federal tax
stamps. Because Congress enjoys wide power to require such stamps,
many cases otherwise governed by state law could be heard in the federal
courts.9 The Gully analysis suggests, however, that because the right to
contract, to convey property or to bequeath an estate is anterior to the
government's power to tax those transactions, the absence of federal tax
stamps might make a good defense to an action based on the document;
analytically, however, it would not form a necessary element of the
underlying right.
Unlike original jurisdiction, appellate review is a determination of the
soundness of a decision already made; the legal issues are framed by a
frozen record. The test for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is whether
the judgment over which review is sought can be reversed on federal
grounds. The question is one of mootness: Has the state's determination
of its own law rendered the federal matter irrelevant? Original jurisdic-
tion is not so limited and involves a determination of whether a decision
based on federal ground will be required. In cases in which it will, original
federal jurisdiction exists; in cases in which it will not, original federal
jurisdiction does not exist. In cases in which it is unclear whether a deci-
sion based on federal ground will be made, original federal jurisdiction
is problematic. Because the determination involves looking to the future,
the question is akin to one of ripeness. The grounds presented for appellate
jurisdiction usually are clear; original jurisdiction depends on matter that
will be presented, and what that includes may be far from clear.
Cases such as Osborn that are inherently incapable of resolution without
resort to federal law "arise under" federal law for jurisdictional purposes
regardless of the presence of nonfederal matters. Jurisdiction exists
because the prediction of federal issue involvement can be made with cer-
tainty. In contrast, a case containing no federal elements -one resting en-
Cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (arising under jurisdiction does
not exist when plaintiff merely alleges that an anticipated defense to his complaint is in-
valid under Constitution); notes 215-67 & accompanying text infra.
98 299 U.S. at 116.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 895-96.
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tirely on state law, for example-cannot be within the arising under
jurisdiction. The prediction of the lack of federal issue involvement can
be made with certainty.
Finally there are those cases in which the decision may rest entirely
on nonfederal grounds or which may require a determination of federal
matter. Deciding the jurisdictional question requires the courts to predict
whether it will be necessary to determine the federal matter. When the
court can say with some confidence that it will be necessary, jurisdiction
should be sustained. When this necessity is not anticipated, the court
should deny jurisdiction, at least until the necessity is demonstrated."'0
Until that time the invocation of the jurisdiction is premature.
Cases presenting federal and nonfederal matter may be of three types.
First, the federal matter may be threshold to the nonfederal matter. Se-
cond, federal and nonfederal grounds for decision may be parallel. And
third, the nonfederal matter may be threshold to the federal matter.
When determination of the federal matter must be made in limine to
the nonfederal matter,0 ' arising under jurisdiction always exists."2 It is
On the question of the party bearing the burden of establishing jurisdiction, see note
128 infra.
,.. E.g., The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913) (patent); Pacific R.R.
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885) (federal incorporation); Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (same).
102 This is true, at least, as a constitutional matter. The preliminary federal matter may
be sufficiently remote from the interests represented in the litigation or the federal in-
terest may be so unlikely to be affected in any significant way, that a legislative determina-
tion to withhold federal judicial power would be appropriate. E.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1349 (1976).
See notes 6-9 & accompanying text supra. Somewhat more problematic are the cases in which
the Court, without explicit legislative sanction, reaches a similar result, often by interpreting
more general statutory language. See, e.g., Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912); Met-
calf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
The problem often arises in cases in which the federal law relied upon incorporates state
law by reference. For example, Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900), was
a suit involving competing mining claims to minerals on United States land under patents
for such claims authorized by federal statute, Revised Statutes of the United States, ch.
6, S 2325, 18 Stat. 428-29 (1874). A federal statute declared the right of possession deter-
minable by "local customs" insofar as these were "applicable and not inconsistent with the
laws of the United States" Id. S 2319, 18 Stat. at 427. The Court denied arising under jurisdic-
tion on the theory that the case might call for no determination of federal law. 177 U.S.
at 513; accord, Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 (1900). Yet, in DeSylva
v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), in which the question was whether an illegitimate child
of an author was entitled to share in the benefits of copyright renewal by "children," the
Court ruled on the merits, with no mention of any jurisdictional problem, despite holding
that the meaning of the word "children" was to be determined by reference to state law.
That the federal courts are to look to state law for a rule of decision may be taken as
some evidence that the federal interest is insufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdic-
tion. That interest may be greater, however, in a case such as DeSylva, as demonstrated
by the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction in cases arising under the copyright law. 28 U.S.C.
S 1338 (1976). But cf. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (no jurisdiction
to determine copyright ownership). The converse situation-state incorporation of federal
law-is treated at note 24 supra. For an analysis of the same problem in the context of
Supreme Court review of state court judgments, see id.
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critical to distinguish here between the necessity of deciding a federal
issue and the necessity for relying on federal law in deciding a case. It
is the latter which is significant in determining the existence of original
jurisdiction. In Osborn, for example, whether or not the parties made an
issue of the bank's capacity, it was a necessary element of the claim and
depended on federal law."' To the extent that federal law must furnish
an ingredient of the case, the case may be said to arise under that law,
regardless of whether its meaning or application is disputed.1 1 The failure
to observe that distinction is the weakness of Justice Johnson's dissent
in Osborn.105
The court may not address the federal predicate explicitly, either
because the parties do not dispute it or because resolution of the
nonfederal matter is more easily dealt with in a manner that disposes of
the case, yet avoids the federal matter. In Osborn, for example, it might
be plain that, as a matter of state law, no contract right of the bank had
been violated, while, as a matter of federal law, the bank's power to enter
a contract might be difficult to determine. The court's option to bypass
the federal issue of the bank's power does not place the case without the
jurisdiction; whether that question would be resolved in favor of the bank's
power or against it, it still would be resolved as a matter of federal law.
If jurisdiction is not dependent upon the outcome of a particular decision,
the failure to make the decision does not deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion. Such a course is analytically impermissible, however.1 16
Similarly, that the court does not explicitly address the threshold federal
matter because the parties do not dispute it does not deprive the court
of jurisdiction. Despite the popular misnomer, the original federal jurisdic-
tion is not "federal question" jurisdiction."7 Justice Johnson's position' 8
notwithstanding, the fact that it is not necessary to resolve a federal ques-
tion is not determinative of a federal court's original jurisdiction; so long
as it is necessary to consider the federal ground in order to decide the
case, as it is in the bank's suit on a contract, original federal jurisdiction
exists.
In such cases original jurisdiction is necessary to fulfill the constitu-
"3 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201 (1918); American Sur. Co. v. Shulz, 237 U.S. 159 (1915); The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913); Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S.
1 (1885); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). But see Shulthis v. McDougal,
225 U.S. 561 (1912).
See notes 82-86 & accompanying text supra.
108 See notes 268-70 & accompanying text infra. But cf. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978) (decision on merits against plaintiff without
deciding difficult jurisdictional issues); note 66 supra (Supreme Court review).
' That characterization is more aptly given the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, see note 70 & accompanying text supra.
"' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 885-89 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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tional purpose of protecting the federal interest from the possibility of
subversion by hostile state courts. Supreme Court review of state
judgments against the bank might well be insufficient protection if a state
court were to clothe its decision in state law."0 9 Thus, were Congress pro-
hibited from authorizing the federal courts to adjudicate cases to which
the bank was a party, it would be unable to protect the bank from a
perceived danger of hostile state judicial action."' Unlike cases in which
nonfederal matter is presented in limine to federal,"' the presence of a
federal interest is not merely potential.
When federal and nonfederal grounds provide parallel bases for resolu-
tion of a case or controversy, a court may rest its decision on either
ground. For example, a plaintiff claiming that some action or inaction by
a defendant violates a right given the plaintiff by state as well as federal
law may prevail without the court's reliance on any federal matter, on
the basis of the federal claim or on both grounds, or the defendant may
prevail on both grounds. It is important to note that for the defendant
to prevail the court must reach both grounds, while if state and federal
law are favorable to the plaintiff, the court may be free to select between
alternative grounds of decision and need not rely on federal matter to
resolve the case."' Thus, the party seeking a federal forum to vindicate
a right allegedly guaranteed by federal law cannot be denied that forum
unless the underlying right is vindicated as a matter of state law.
A case brought on two parallel theories, analytically though not fac-
tually unrelated, comprises two separable claims."' Although the two
claims may be treated as presenting a single constitutional "case,""4 they
also can be treated as distinct."5 In either event, there is jurisdiction over
the federal claim."6 If, however, the claim is of constitutional magnitude-
and, perhaps, even if it is not-a court might, to avoid unnecessary federal
litigation,"7 treat the case not as one presenting parallel federal-nonfederal
"' Note 84 & accompanying text supra.
110 See notes 7-10 & accompanying text supra.
" Notes 118-21 infra.
1 See text accompanying note 180 infra.
... See Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Recon-
sidered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978).
1.4 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
"' Id. at 725-26 (discretion to hear pendent claim).
"' On the question whether and in what circumstances the parallel (pendent) state claim
should be adjudicated in the federal court, see generally 13 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 176, S 3567; C. WRIGHT, supra note 33, S 19.
17 "Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under
the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without
important reasons." Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). See, e.g., Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47 & n.12 (1974); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
498 (1941); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). But see Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,
628-29 (1974); cf. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 394-96 (1932) (discussion of state ques-
tion but decision of constitutional question).
The frequency with which the policy is expressed and applied is not matched by the adum-
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bases for decision, but rather as one belonging to the next category-
cases requiring determination of nonfederal matter in order to reach
federal matter.
When a determination of nonfederal matter must be made in limine
to federal matter, a court is not free to select among alternative grounds
of decision. If the nonfederal matter supports the existence of the federal
claim, the court must consider the federal matter; if the nonfederal mat-
ter does not, the court is precluded from considering the federal matter."'
Whether the case arises under federal law depends upon the resolution
of the preliminary nonfederal matter. For example, a complaint alleging
that a particular state statute is federally unconstitutional does not pre-
sent a claim arising under federal law if the challenged statute is inap-
plicable to the plaintiff as a matter of state law.' In that situation the
plaintiff would lack the requisite standing to adjudicate the claim of
bration of its justification. It is, perhaps, no more than a particular manifestation of the
craftsmanship ideal of deciding cases on narrow rather than broad grounds. The policy also
may ber justified, however, on more profound social and political grounds, that is, as a pro-
jection of democratic theory. To the extent that a particular decision is constitutionally
based it is insulated from legislative action, either state or federal. The ability of the peo-
ple to change the law is limited to the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment.
U.S. CONST. art. IV. The democratic process is thus infringed upon. To the extent that pro-
cess is perceived as a value, there is a substantial interest in avoiding such infringements.
Similarly, one would expect that where there is the choice between resting a decision on
state grounds or federal grounds (even of less than constitutional magnitude), preference
would be for the former. Although the effects of a decision based on nonconstitutional federal
law may be altered by Congress (and the decision is therefore less intrusive on the democratic
ideal than one based on constitutional grounds), such a decision is more intrusive than one
grounded in state law because the latter is subject to change through a political process
in which the individual citizen may have greater influence.
"I Interesting and extraordinarily complex analytic difficulties arise when the source of
law for resolving the matter preliminary to the claimed federal matter is not clearly federal
or nonfederal. The problem arises in cases in which federal law does not of itself define
the content of some necessary element of a claim otherwise federally protected.
For example, to establish a claim that the obligation of a contract has been impaired in
violation of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 10, cl. 1, requires that the existence of a
contractual obligation be established before consideration is given to whether the federal
right to be free from impairment has been violated. The predicate matter, however, ap-
parently is not determinable by federal constitutional standards. See Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 200 (2d ed. 1975). However, state
court determinations of this issue do not bind the Supreme Court as they would were the
matter governed by state law. E.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)
(reversal of state court determination of no contractual obligation); United States Mortgage
Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232 (1934) (reversal of state court determination of contractual
obligation).
Thus, the source of law for determining the existence of the underlying claimed contrac-
tual obligation is obscure, Similar difficulties arise in many cases in which federal law has
been held to "incorporate" state law. See note 102 supra. Compare DeSylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570 (1956) (federal jurisdiction upheld), with Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177
U.S. 505 (1900) (federal jurisdiction found not to exist). The converse situation, incorpora-
tion of federal law by the state, is analyzed in note 24 supra.
Ill Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S.
476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941); cf. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (parallel claims; decision on
state claim).
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unconstitutionality."' The applicability of the challenged statute is an issue
governed exclusively by state law. If the statute is inapplicable to the
plaintiff, the federal court is without jurisdiction. In these circumstances,
the nonfederal matter is a jurisdictional fact that must be determined
before a federal court may properly entertain the case. 2'
In the context of Supreme Court review of a state court judgment that
the statute does not apply to the plaintiff, jurisdiction would be lacking
because the judgment would rest on an adequate nonfederal ground.1"
Moreover, in that context, such a conclusion would be based on a definitive,
binding' 3 determination of the jurisdictional fact '2 4 which would render
the federal issue moot.
In the context of original jurisdiction, by contrast, there may be no
definitive, binding determination of nonfederal questions." State law may
be unsettled; the question may be one of first impression. The court has
the power to decide the preliminary nonfederal matter as a question of
jurisdictional fact.' 8 Nevertheless, there may be considerable risk of the
federal court's deciding its jurisdiction erroneously, based upon its deter-
mination of the unclear preliminary nonfederal matter."
The court may determine that the party seeking to invoke federal
jurisdiction has failed to meet the burden of proving the "facts" necessary
to support jurisdiction." Indeed, the party seeking to invoke the jurisdic-
'2 See note 178 infra.
2 For example, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), plaintiffs sought injunctive
and declaratory relief against enforcement of a New Hampshire statute making it a misde-
meanor to obscure the figures or letters of a license plate. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 262:27-c
(1978) (amended 1979). They claimed that enforcement of the statute against them for covering
the state's motto, "live free or die," N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 263:1 (1978) (amended 1979), on
their license plate violated their constitutional rights. Before proceeding to the merits of
the claim, the Court found it necessary to note that "[tlhe term 'letters' [in the statute]
has been interpreted by the State's highest court to include the state motto:' 430 U.S. at 707.
"2 See notes 15-66 & accompanying text supra.
123 Where the state court's interpretation of state law is influenced by its view of federal
law, however, the Supreme Court has asserted jurisdiction. See note 24 supra.
22 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See note 17 supra.
2 See United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963). Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (abstention ordered in eminent domain diversity
case; state law unclear), with County of Allesheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959)
(abstention refused in eminent domain diversity case; state law clear). But see Howell v.
Union Producing Co., 392 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1968) (district court properly decided state law
in interpleader action); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967) (am-
biguity of state law insufficient basis for abstention).
12 Federal courts, of course, have jurisdiction to determine their jurisdiction, a notion
Professor Dobbs has called "incipient jurisdiction," Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing
the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MrNN. L. REv. 491, 497
(1967); see United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 289-93 (1947) (alternative
holding); id. at 310. (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
"' Cf. Notes 63-66 & accompanying text supra (Supreme Court review).
122 Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936);
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
It is by no means clear that the burden of proof has always rested on the plaintiff. The
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holding in McNutt, the leading case on burden of proof, was based on interpretation of the
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, S 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472, which provided:
[I]f... it shall appear to the satisfaction of [t]he ... [circuit court], at any time
... [that a] suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy
properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court .... the said [circuit court]
shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the
court from which it was removed....
The authority vested in and the duty imposed on the court by the statute to inquire into
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding was contrary to earlier ideas that jurisdiction
could be sustained on the basis-of only the plaintiff's allegations and that the party assert-
ing jurisdiction could be relieved of the burden of showing it, whenever required to, by
procedural formalities. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. at 189. Thus,
the Court held that the statute mandated that the burden of proof of jurisdiction be on
the plaintiff. Id. at 188-89.
The procedural formalities seemed to place the burden of proof on the party challenging
jurisdiction. The federal courts were governed initially by common law pleading rules,
modified somewhat because they were courts of limited jurisdiction. Under these rules, the
plaintiff was required to allege facts showing jurisdiction, e.g., Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 112, 116 (1834). If he did not, his case could be dismissed at any stage for want of
jurisdiction, upon suggestion of either the defendant, Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
148 (1834); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382, 384 (1798); see Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393, 402 (1856), or even the plaintiff himself, Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 126 (1804).
Jurisdictional challenges not apparent on the face of the pleadings had to be raised by
the defendant by plea of abatement, the required means for raising objections to both per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198, 216
(1849); D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 476, 498 (1828). If it was not filed, or if it was
not filed before a plea to the merits, objection to jurisdiction was foreclosed. DeSobry v.
Nicholson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 420, 423 (1865); Sheppard v. Graves, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 505, 510
(1852).
If jurisdiction was challenged by plea in abatement, the burden of proof was said to be
on the movant to establish lack of jurisdiction. Whether the burden of proof referred to
was a burden of persuasion or only a burden of production is not clear. In a context clearly
referring to burden of persuasion, Chief Justice Hughes, reviewing the earlier cases cited
in McNutt, stated that the burden of proof was on the movant. 298 U.S. at 189. Dicta in
Sheppard v. Graves, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 504, 510 (1852), often cited for the proposition that
the burden of proof rests on the movant, also seem to refer to the burden of persuasion.
The Court in Sheppard may have been talking only about a burden of production or going
forward, since the defendant in that case introduced no evidence to support his contention
that there was no diversity of citizenship. See also DeSobry v. Nicholson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
at 423.
The Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196, 197, changed procedure in the federal
courts to follow the procedures of the states in which they were located. If a state permit-
ted jurisdictional objections to be raised by means other than the plea of abatement, the
federal court would do so as well. E.g., Roberts v. Lewis, 144 U.S. 653, 657 (1892).
The effect on federal procedure, particularly the burden of proof, of the Judiciary Act
of 1875 was not settled until McNutt. Language in some decisions had indicated that the
statute changed the method by which the objection to jurisdiction could be raised; apparently
the plea in abatement was no longer necessary. In Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138,
144 (1885), for example, the Court said that the old rule was changed and "the courts were
given full authority to protect themselves against the false pretenses of apparent parties."
This language can and probably should be read to mean only that a judge was now entitled
to inquire into jurisdiction in all cases even in the absence of objection, not necessarily that
a party could raise a jurisdictional objection at any time. See Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pin-
ckney, 149 U.S. 194, 200 (1893); Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588, 591 (1886). But see Steigleder
v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141, 142 (1905); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326 (1889) (dictum).
See also Deputron v. Young, 134 U.S. 241, 251 (1890).
Although the methods by which one could challenge jurisdiction were relaxed, the burden
was apparently still on the movant to prove lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hunt v.
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tion frequently denies the existence of the federal claim by alleging that
the state action whose constitutionality is being challenged is, as a mat-
ter of state law, inapplicable to him." Alternatively, the court may con-
clude that it is unable to determine the preliminary nonfederal question
and dismiss the case without prejudice to its reinstitution after a definitive
determination of the preliminary nonfederal question at a time when the
federal claim will have matured. 30 Or the court may conclude that it is
unable to determine the preliminary nonfederal question, yet hold the case
while seeking"' or directing the parties to seek ' a definitive state court
New York Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322, 333 (1907). In Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U.S. 79 (1912),
however, the Court held that the burden of proving personal jurisdiction, at least where
it rested on jurisdiction in rem, was on the plaintiff, distinguishing the cases in which the
burden of proof as to subject matter jurisdiction was placed on the defendant. Id. at 85.
In this case, since the-statute provided that where jurisdiction was in rem, the judgment
could only affect the property by reason of which jurisdiction was obtained, the primafacie
presumption of jurisdiction could not apply and the burden of proof had to rest on the plain-
tiff. Id. at 87.
Although the Chase Court came to the anomalous result that a defendant challenging
subject matter jurisdiction had the burden of proof, while one challenging personal jurisdic-
tion, at least where jurisdiction in rem was involved, did not, it did raise the question whether
the rule placing the burden of proof on the movant in the former case was consistent with
the statute requiring the court to dismiss on its own motion if subject matter jurisdiction
was found not to exist. Id. at 85-86. That inconsistency was not resolved until McNutt.
11 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Alabama barretry statute); City of Meridian
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) (Mississippi statute imposing charge
on utilities for use of public streets); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958)
(ordinance requiring transportation company to get state license); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (statute making reservation of mineral rights imprescrip-
tible not applicable where parties have contracted); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101 (1944) (tax on doing business not applicable to company doing interstate business
only); see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (educa-
tion requirements of statute regulating practice of medicine not applicable to chiroprac-
tors, argued in state court proceeding following abstention).
11 Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 401-03 (1941); accord, Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U.S. 549 (1947) (Supreme Court held case not ripe for its decision because state law
uncertain); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945) (same); cf. Wheeler
v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974) (state administrative agencies given opportunity to devise
programs to meet federal constitutional and statutory objections); Public Serv. Comm'n v.
Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952) (same).
A court may dismiss in a second situation. Where abstention would be the proper course
but a state court has ruled it cannot decide a case still pending in federal court, the federal
court will dismiss in order to obtain an adjudication of the state issues. Harris County
Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 & n.14 (1975).
"I, The court may itself seek the determination of state law in jurisdictions in which cer-
tification of questions of law to the highest state court is permitted. See Uniform Certifica-
tion of Questions of Law Act S 1, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 52 (1975) (providing that the highest
court of a state may answer questions certified to it by the Supreme Court, a United States
court of appeals or district court when there are questions of state law that may be deter-
minative of the case and there are no controlling precedents). The provisions of the Act
have been adopted, with some variations, in 23 states. Table of Adopting Jurisdictions,
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 17 (Supp. 1981).
The Supreme Court has expressed its approval of the use of the procedure, Lehman Bros.
v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974), and has itself used it, Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647
(1978). See also Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (availability of the certification procedure
in Massachusetts cited as additional factor in favor of abstention).
' E.g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959);
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determination.
Finally, the court may simply proceed to a decision of the federal mat-
ter without an explicit determination of the preliminary nonfederal
question."' The preliminary nonfederal matter might not be raised by the
parties who join issue only on the federal matter."' That is, in the exam-
ple above, the parties may not dispute the applicability of the statute to
the challenging party, but may dispute only its federal constitutionality.
This is tantamount to the parties' stipulation of the jurisdictional fact. 35
To the extent that this is the basis for the court's assertion of jurisdic-
tion, it entails the implicit determination of the state law issue, at least
for purposes of the case.'36
It may be that the parties contest the nonfederal matter, but the court
chooses to bypass the issue, 1 3' when, for example, the state law issue is
not free from doubt and the court is confident of the resolution of the
federal issue. Such action by the court is impermissible: If the party assert-
ing the federal right is to prevail the court must determine the predicate
state matter in a way that will permit it to reach the federal matter. A
federal court may not bypass a contested question of state law in order
to reach federal matter that may be determined only if the nonfederal
predicate has been established. To consider the question of unconstitu-
tionality without a prior determination that the statute injures the plain-
tiff is to determine a case on the merits without first establishing jurisdic-
tion to do so."' It is to fail to recognize the analytic hierarchy of the case."9
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974) (situation when abstention is not appropriate); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1971) (same); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
,1 See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978); Irving Trust
Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942) (Supreme Court assumed a contract and proceeded to im-
pairment question); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (Supreme Court assumed
challenged action permissible under state constitution and decided federal question); cf. note
66 supra (Supreme Court review). But see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960)
(court of appeals wrong in deciding constitutional question without deciding preliminary
state questions, but fact that jurisdiction based on diversity may have been significant).
See also notes 268-70 & accompanying text infra.
"4 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); A.F. of L. v. Wat-
son, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); see Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972). Cf. notes
30-35 & accompanying text supra (Supreme Court review of state court judgment).
"' See DiFrischia v. New York Central R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). See also notes
50 supra, 240 infra.
"4 Cf. note 57 & accompanying text supra (Supreme Court review).
IS, E.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943) (whether state
law gave commission power to fix rates retroactively); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S.
175 (1909) (semble); cf Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (circuit court decided
due process question without deciding preliminary question whether state statute applied);
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (Court bypassed question whether governor had
authority under state constitution to issue challenged orders, even though three-judge panel
had enjoined enforcement on that basis).
'See notes 268-70 & accompanying text infra. But ef. note 66 supra (Supreme Court
review).
'" Note 270 & accompanying text infra.
"0 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
"' See notes 155-75 & accompanying text infra.
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Thus, if the defendant prevails on the nonfederal issue-the applicability
to the plaintiff of the challenged statute-the court must consider plain-
tiff's claimed federal right. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff prevails on
the nonfederal issue the federal question never arises: the plaintiff is free
of the challenged statute's operation without resort to federal law. The
so-called abstention doctrine perhaps best illustrates the application of
these principles.
ABSTENTION AND THE POTENTIAL NONFEDERAL GROUND
In a long line of cases, the best known of which is undoubtedly Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co.,1 0 the federal courts have formulated a doc-
trine of abstention which rests on no stated satisfactory conceptual base.1 '
Pullman is the paradigm case.' It arose when the Texas Railroad Com-
mission promulgated a regulation requiring any sleeping car operating on
any line in the state to be in the charge of a Pullman conductor.'
Theretofore the practice had been that trains having only a single sleep-
ing car were in the charge of a porter, while trains having two or more
such cars were in a conductor's charge. 4 Pullman conductors were white;
Pullman porters were not.'"
The'Pullman Company and the affected railroads brought suit in federal
district court to enjoin enforcement of the regulation; Pullman porters
intervened as complainants and Pullman conductors supported the regula-
tion. A three-judge district court granted the injunction4 " and the defen-
dants appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The complainants attack-
ed the validity of the regulation on several grounds, including the power
of the commission, under Texas law, to issue it, as well as its constitu-
"' The discussion that follows is limited to what frequently has been referred to as
Pullman-type abstention. The "abstention" doctrines of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
and its progeny, in which the federal courts are asked to interfere with state judicial pro-
ceedings, present related but distinct issues. See generally note 171 infra. Other cases
sometimes included within the abstention doctrine, but in which the basis of jurisdiction
is other than a claim that the case arises under federal law, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (diversity of citizenship jurisdiction); see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 33, S 52, are beyond the scope of this analysis, as are those cases in which,
despite the existence of constitutional and statutory bases of jurisdiction, the federal court
simply dismisses, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951)
(challenge to state regulatory commission order); Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946)
(dictum) (probate); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (dictum) (divorce); cf.
Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967) (alternative holding) (child custody).
All of the cases in which the federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in the absence
of statutory authority to do so implicate values closely associated with the power of the
state qua sovereign. See note 173 infra.
"' 312 U.S. at 497.
144 Id,
145 Id.
14' Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
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tionality under the commerce clause, the due process clause and, apparent-
ly, the equal protection clause.147 The opinion of the district court rested
entirely on the ground that under Texas law the commission was without
power to issue the challenged order. The court cited no federal authority
and expressly declined to consider the constitutionality of the regulation,
finding such a determination "unnecessary." '148
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Supreme Court, found that the
equal protection claim of the Pullman porters tendered a substantial con-
stitutional issue."' Nonetheless resolution of that issue by the federal
judiciary could be avoided if, under the law of Texas, the commission were
without power to issue the challenged order." It was on this ground that
the lower court had enjoined enforcement of the order."1 Rather than
refusing to adjudicate the alternative nonfederal issue, however, Justice
Frankfurter declared a doctrine of abstention under which the federal
courts were to retain jurisdiction of the case but were not to adjudicate
it until and unless the state court determined the threshold issue of state
law in a way that required adjudication of the constitutional question."2
Justice Frankfurter's reference to the substantiality of the constitutional
issue makes it apparent that the Court believed the district court had
had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case and that the Court could, therefore,
properly hear the appeal." As Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court in Cohens v. Virginia,"' had declared:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.
... With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
Although the Court referred to challenges based on the commerce clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, S 8, cl. 3, and the due process clause, id. amend. XIV, S 1, the only claim character-
ized as presenting "a substantial constitutional issue," 312 U.S. at 498, was that based upon
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. That issue was neither addressed
nor noted in the per curiam opinion of the district court, 33 F. Supp. at 675.
... 33 F. Supp. at 676.
"' 312 U.S. at 498.
5 See id.; note 117 supra.
"' 33 F. Supp. at 677. Given the disposition of the case on nonconstitutional grounds,
the Supreme Court could have found itself without jurisdiction to review the decision of
the district court on direct appeal. Cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 303-04
(1913) (three-judge court not required when state statute challenged on state constitutional
grounds).
Whatever the law may have been at the time Pullman was decided, subsequent
developments, ironically, suggest rather strongly the Court's lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,
419 U.S. 90 (1974); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 86-87 (1971); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970); of Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S.
30 (1933) (three-judge court not required to determine jurisdiction). But see Philbrook v.
Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975). See generally Note, Federal Courts-Three Judges or One? A
Problem of Overlapping Power in the District Courts, 34 MD. L. REv. 634 (1974).
' 312 U.S. at 500-01.
"' See note 3 supra.
'u 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
1981]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given."'
The Pullman case appears to violate this principle, and has been criti-
cized on this ground ' as well as for the waste of scarce judicial resources
that its duplicative scheme undoubtedly engendered. 57 The cost of absten-
tion is often dear.158 The Court has defended the doctrine, claiming that
it "does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but
only the postponement of its exercise." '159 In Pullman, Justice Frankfurter
found justification for the practice in the notion that a suit for injunctive
relief, being equitable in nature, was an appeal to the wise discretion of
the chancellor;6 ° the desirability of avoiding a choice between adjudicating
a constitutional issue that might not require adjudication and determin-
ing a question of unclear state law erroneously, tentatively and in a con-
text in which it might be displaced by a different state court interpreta-
tion counseled that that discretion be exercised on the side of restraint.
Thus, much of the Pullman rationale appeared to be based on the discre-
tion of a court of equity. 8' The opinion, however, misconceived the ap-
propriate exercise of discretion. The historical power of the chancellor
to determine the adequacy of possible legal remedies, and to remit the
parties to the law side on that basis, is, as Justice Frankfurter later noted,
"' Id. at 404 (dictum); cf. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 & n.6 (1963)
(availability of other forum does not justify federal court's refusal to adjudicate civil rights
claim). See also Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
" Currie, supra note 76, at 317; McMillan, Abstention-The Judiciary's Self-Inflicted Wound,
56 N.C.L. REV. 527, 529 & n.15, 543-45 (1978); see Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial
Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 (1959). But see Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEx. L. REV. 815, 815 (1959).
E.g., ALI STUDY. supra note 75, at 283-84; Bezanson, Abstention.: The Supreme Court and
Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1117 n.51 (1974); Currie, supra note 76,
at 317.
11 The extraordinary delay occasioned by the procedure has been noted often, e.g., Har-
ris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 89, 91 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425-26 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring); ALI STUDY, supra note 75, at 283-84; 17 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 76, S 4243, at 480-81 & n.39 (1978).
159 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959); accord, England v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964); cf. United States v. Michigan Nat'l Corp.,
419 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (per curiam) (standing determination using abstention analogy).
The Court has ordered dismissal of the federal case when the state court holds it cannot
decide a case pending in another court. See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420
U.S. 77, 88 & n.14 (1975); cf. cases cited in note 60 supra (Court vacates when state court
will not clarify its decision while case pending in Supreme Court).
16" 312 U.S. at 500.
.6. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949);
McMillan, supra note 156, at 527 n.3; Note, Federal Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's
Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604,606 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Justice
Frankfurter's Doctrine]; see Pell, Abstention-A Primrose Path by Any Other Name, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 926,933 (1972); Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
226, 246 (1959).
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simply inapposite when the question is not one of legal as opposed to
equitable forum, but rather one of state as opposed to federal forum.'62
That is, for a federal court of equity to refuse to intervene because there
is an adequate legal remedy is quite different from suggesting that a
federal court of equity should stay its hand when there is an adequate
remedy in a state court of equity.'" To suggest that the remedy in state
court is adequate'" is anomalous because the basis of providing for federal
judicial power in the first instance is the lack of confidence in the ade-
quacy of the state forum to which the case is to be remitted.'65 Moreover,
although Justice Frankfurter's opinion appears to have been based on
some sort of equitable discretion, the Pullman doctrine is applied even
when federal judicial power is sought to be invoked "on the law side."16
The abstention cases have been read as standing for the proposition
that the federal courts have "discretion" to refuse to adjudicate cases ap-
parently within the arising under jurisdiction until a state court deter-
mination of an issue of unclear state law has been made, if such a deter-
mination might render the determination of the federal question on which
federal jurisdiction is based unnecessary. 6" Three justifications have been
advanced for the practice of abstention: first, the avoidance of deciding
2 "An 'adequate remedy at law,' as a bar to equitable relief in the federal courts, refers
to a remedy on the law side of federal courts." Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 359 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "[11t was never a doctrine of equity
that a federal court should exercise its judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because
a State court could entertain it." Id. at 361 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
1'3 White v. Sparkill Realty Co., 280 U.S. 500 (1930).
I" See Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914) (exhaustion of state judicial remedies
not required). See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 101 (1973).
' See note 6 supra.
'" Abstention has been applied in cases in which only a declaratory judgment was sought,
Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.,
316 U.S. 168 (1942), although whether a declaratory judgment can be considered a legal
remedy is questionable, see Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590,
596 & n.30 (1977). It also has been ordered in damage actions involving constitutional ques-
tions, in which diversity is the jurisdictional base. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41
(1970) (per curiam); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (per
curiam).
167 Language in the Court's opinion has created some confusion. It has spoken of absten-
tion as involving a "discretionary exercise of the court's equity powers," e.g., Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964), although the formulation in terms of equity discretion is
clearly wrong, see note 160 & accompanying text supra. In at least two cases in which refusal
to abstain was upheld, the Court stated that the lower court had not "abused its discre-
tion," Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 580 (1973); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534
(1965), seeming to use "abuse of discretion" in the usual sense.
The decision to abstain, however, seems not to be "discretionary" in the usual sense. See
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 429-30 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring); Pell, supra note 161, at 933-34 (review has de nero aspect); Wright, supra
note 156, at 825-27 (review should be discretionary). Compare the discretion to certify ques-
tions of state law in diversity cases discussed in Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91
(1974).
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unnecessary federal or constitutional questions;168 second, the avoidance
of friction between the federal judiciary and the states;"9 and third, the
avoidance of error in determining state law.17 None of the three tradi-
tional justifications is satisfying.
The problem of error is present in any case. With respect to state law,
it is unlikely to be significantly greater for federal judges, who are typical-
ly trained in local law, than it is for state judges."' A court's refusal to
decide a case properly before it on the ground that it may decide it er-
roneously is judicially irresponsible.
Avoiding friction between the federal judiciary and the states is a
laudable goal. Unfortunately, the invocation of that talismanic justifica-
tion often serves as a substitute for analysis of the underlying issues.
Whether framed in terms of "Our Federalism,"' "comity" or some equal-
Traditionally, the "discretion" label describes a heavier burden on a party seeking to
overturn a particular ruling in a higher court within the same judicial system: an abuse
of discretion must be shown. With regard to abstention, the "discretion" label describes
systemic leeways, i.e., the decisionmaking freedoms of a particular court system unbound
by hard rules. It describes not the relationship of a higher to a lower court within the same
system on resolution of a particular issue, but rather the relationship of the system to the
mode of resolution of a given issue. Hence, to overturn a lower court's exercise of "discre-
tion" in situations such as Pullman and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), it is not
necessary to show abuse of discretion, but simply that the court below reached the wrong
result. But cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-64 (1978) (district court's exer-
cise of discretion was not permitted to be overridden by writ of mandamus). On the mean-
ings of "discretion," see generally Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14,32-36
(1967).
" E.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 498; Bezanson, supra
note 157, at 1134; Note, Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine, supra note 161, at 617-19. But see
Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 629 (1974) ("We are
in general accord, of course, with the dissent's view of the importance of... constitutional
decision-avoidance principles .... But those standards are susceptible of misuse:'); Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 214 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (deploring "automatic
application of 'canons of constitutional adjudication' so absolute that a federal court can
never under any circumstances or conditions decide a constitutional question if there is
any possibility of turning a case away on other grounds").
Federal district judges rated this factor more significant than any other. Ashman, Alfini
& Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspectives on Its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629,
649-50 (1975).
"' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
at 500-01; Note, Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine, supra note 161, at 619-21.
"' Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 229 (1957); Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at
499-500; Note, Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine, supra note 161, at 613-17.
"' See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. at 499.
"7 The initial capitals are inevitable. Cf Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral At-
tack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 142 (1970) ("Great Writ").
173 See, e.g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167,
177 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 500. But see England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The same considerations of deference to the states, or nonintervention, at least in cer-
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ly convenient catchphrase, it does no more than state a result. If the an-
ticipated friction arises from a federal court's determination of state law,
it is difficult to perceive why that friction is any greater than in the vast
number of cases in which federal courts must determine and apply local
law. Similarly, if the anticipated friction arises from the possibility of
federal intervention between the state and the citizen based upon federal
law, it is difficult to perceive why that friction is any greater than in those
cases in which federal courts are called upon to enforce claimed federal
rights or duties over the opposition of the state. It is for this very pur-
pose, in the latter instance, that a federal forum is made available. Among
the justifications for the arising under jurisdiction is the protection of
federal rights against the potential hostility of state courts 4.17 One would
think this protection most appropriate in cases in which the claimed federal
right is antagonistic to state interests.
The mere avoidance of unnecessary constitutional adjudication is a
spurious justification for Pullmavtype abstention.175 A federal court avoids
constitutional adjudication by deciding a case on lesser grounds, not by
remitting the parties to some other court.
This ground of abstention is a valid basis, however, for a doctrine that
maintains the appropriate balance between the exercise of state and
federal judicial power. If it is truly unnecessary to adjudicate the federal
claims pressed by the parties originally invoking the federal jurisdiction,
it may be said that the case is not one that arises under federal law. A
case does not arise under a corpus of law that the adjudicating tribunal
need not or cannot apply. Moreover, in Pullman and like cases, the party
seeking entry to federal court is the party who is claiming that he is en-
titled to a favorable disposition on the basis of state law. Thus, the party
seeking to invoke the federal judicial power denies, on the face of the com-
plaint, the propriety of its exercise.
The typical case is a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute,
presenting two issues: first, the meaning, interpretation or application of
tain matters, underlie the other "abstention" doctrines, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 43-45 (1971); Martin v. Creasey, 360 U.S. 219, 224 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327-34 (1943); see
note 142 supra. The Court has noted that comity underlies the various doctrines, although
often by grouping the other types of cases with Pullman under the broad rubric "absten-
tion:' E.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 & n.11 (1967); County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360
U.S. at 27-29. In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976), the Court indicated that a federal action should be dismissed although neither the
policy of avoiding constitutional decisions nor concerns of comity, in its various manifesta-
tions, were involved. The Court noted the vital interests of the states in husbanding and
controlling a scarce but critical natural resource. Id. at 804, 820.
"' Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 359 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in result); ALI STUDY. supra note 75, at 163; Currie, supra note 76, at 316-17;
see note 6 supra.
I7s See ALI STUDY. supra note 75, at 286-87.
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the statute and, second, its constitutionality. It should be obvious that
the second question cannot be determined until after resolution of the first;
it is absurd to consider the validity of a measure without knowing its
meaning." Thus, the federal question-the constitutionality of the state
enactment-is predicated on the state law question-the proper inter-
pretation of the enactment.
Cases conforming to this analytic model may be presented to a court
in several related, though distinct, manifestations. For example, a statute
regulating speech may be challenged as vague and overbroad; yet, the
statute may be subject to a narrowing interpretation that will obviate
the challenge. 7 Similarly, whether a state statute challenged on federal
grounds is, as a matter of state law, applicable to the party seeking to
have it struck down is a question that must be determined before the court
can resolve the issue of the statute's validity. If the statute is not prop-
erly applicable to the party challenging it, he or she may lack standing
to adjudicate its validity. 8 In any event, a determination of the meaning
"I E.g., Town of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 (1946); Siler v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909); ALI STUDY, supra note 75, at 286. But see Ohio Bureau
of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977) (upholding a refusal to abstain
but noting, "We follow the proper course for federal courts by considering first whether
abstention is required, then whether there is a statutory ground of resolution, and finally,
only if the challenge persists, whether the statute violates the Constitution." (emphasis
supplied)).
In certain cases, however, there may be no construction of the statute that would avoid
the constitutional question. The challenge may be that the statute is vague, not because
a particular plaintiff cannot tell whether it applies to him, but because it does not make
clear what conduct is prohibited, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); see Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The statute also may be challenged for overbreadth. E.g.,
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). See also Wiscon-
sin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (statute providing for public posting of alcohol ban
against individual unconstitutional on its face because it made no provision for notice and
hearing).
" E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953)
(per curiam); see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
"' The plaintiff in such a situation may simply fail to meet the minimal standing require-
ment of injury in fact, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 734-35 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-100
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), involving a causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 261 (1977), which, regardless of what additional "prudential factors" are now
necessary, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 80-81, is
constitutionally required.
Compare the different problem of the plaintiff to whom a statute applies and who is clearly
injured, seeking to invalidate it on ground not applicable to him. Such a plaintiff has met
the constitutional requirements for standing, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976),
but faces the additional obstacle of qualifying to assert the constitutional rights of others,
see id. at 195-97.
The abstention doctrine also can be analogized to ripeness, with which standing often
overlaps. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 81; Note,
Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine, supra note 161, at 612-13, 618-19.
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of the statute is essential to a proper formulation of the constitutional
question.
In cases such as these the propriety of exercising federal judicial power
depends upon a determination of state law. The resolution of that threshold
question may terminate the litigation without resort to federal law. Where
that is true, the case is determinable on adequate and independent
nonfederal grounds and there is no justiciable controversy arising under
federal law. In such cases the exercise of federal judicial power is un-
necessary to protect the party who first sought to invoke it. If the federal
issue is foreclosed by the determination of state law-if the case is deter-
minable on adequate nonfederal grounds-the interest sought to be vin-
dicated by the invocation of federal judicial power will be vindicated
without resort to that power."1 ' Just as a state court decision that a statute
challenged on federal constitutional grounds does not apply to the party
challenging it would bar Supreme Court review,'1 ' so an analogous deter-
mination renders the exercise of original federal jurisdiction improper.
In neither instance is the case one that arises under federal law, for in
neither is there occasion to rely on federal matter to resolve the contro-
versy. Further, in neither case is the party claiming the federal right in-
jured by any illegitimate exercise of state power.
The remaining question concerns the appropriate forum for determin-
ing the meaning, interpretation or application of state law when that is
necessary in order to determine the question of federal jurisdiction. There
is power in the federal courts to make the determination. 8' Given the ex-
istence of this power, why should a court "abstain" from its exercise?
Unlike most other jurisdictional determinations, the question of federal
jurisdiction in these cases is inextricably intertwined with the state ques-
tion on the merits. From the federal perspective the state law determina-
tion is peripheral to the merits of the case; viewed from the state perspec-
tive, however, that determination may be the decision on the merits. The
state's interest in the proper resolution of its own law substantially
outweighs any federal interest that might exist at this point. Indeed, it
is perhaps not too much to say that the federal interest does not come
to fruition unless and until the state law question has been resolved against
the party who claims federal protection. The only federal judicial interest
existing precedent to such a resolution is that against the unnecessary
exercise of federal judicial power. 8'
" See text accompanying note 112 supra.
' See notes 18-19 & accompanying text supra.
1 See note 126 & accompanying text supra.
" See note 243 infra. That is not to say, of course, that the federal court confronted with
a Pullman situation should dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The retention of jurisdiction
based upon the need to protect the potential federal interest is justified and often desirable.
The doctrinal basis for retaining the case until the state court has determined the predicate
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In determining whether to exercise the power to decide predicate ques-
tions of state law, given the powerful state interest in correct resolution
of such questions, an additional factor must be evaluated: the societal in-
terest in efficient allocation of scarce resources. The litigiousness of
American society makes a process requiring a great expenditure of judicial
time and energy undesirable. It is sensible that one tribunal, rather than
two, hear and dispose of related state and federal issues.3 In cases in
which it is necessary to reach the federal issue that one tribunal is federal;
in cases in which it is not, state. The difficulty is in determining, at the
time federal jurisdiction is invoked, into which category a particular case
falls.
An appropriate calculus for this determination must take several fac-
tors into account."' The likelihood that the case cannot be finally deter-
mined without resort to federal law increases the value of having the
federal court determine the case initially because this advances the goal
of a single adjudication. Thus, one factor to be considered is the adequacy
and availability of a state court proceeding to determine the predicate
issue of state law;" an already pending state court proceeding involving
the same or similarly situated parties or interests is a factor favoring
abstention.' Because the state's interest is in the correct determination
of its own law, the more confident the federal court is of its ability to
vindicate that interest -that is, the greater the clarity of the state law -
the less reluctant it should be in deciding the predicate state question.",
issue of state law is the notion of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, note 126 supra.
If the state court's determination is adequate to protect the party invoking jurisdiction
without resort to federal law, the federal court should then dismiss. Until that point is reach-
ed, however, the lack of certainty on the jurisdictional question warrants continuing federaljudicial presence. "That a favorable decision in the state court might moot the plaintiffs
constitutional claim brought to the federal court was never thought to create any jurisdic-
tional impediment." United States v. Michigan Nat'l Corp., 419 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (emphasis
added). But cf. Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77,88 & n.14 (1975) (dismissal
where state court held it could not decide case pending in another court); note 60 supra
(Court vacates where state court will not clarify ruling while case pending in Supreme Court).
" Cf., e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction); notes
113-16 & accompanying text supra (same).
"' Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974). See generally Pell, supra note 161; Shoenfeld, American
Federalism and the Abstention Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 73 DICK. L. REV. 605 (1969).
E.g., Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
" Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam).
" That it is the state's interest that the doctrine protects is suggested in Ohio Bureau
of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), in which the Court noted that the state
had voluntarily submitted to the federal forum. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Li-
quor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) (noting that neither party had requested abstention); Chicago
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958) (federal courts properly ruled on validity of
unambiguous city ordinance without awaiting determination by state courts). But cf. Cur-
rie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,76-77
(1964) (noting and criticizing inability of state to waive protection Congress intended to pro-
vide it by enacting three-judge court requirement).
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Finally, the particular federal interest, and the time and money necessary
to its vindication resulting from abstention, must be considered.1"
Cases in which the state law claim is parallel to, rather than a predicate
of, the federal claim"1 9 are only slightly more difficult. Although in such
cases resolution of the state claim is not necessary for consideration of
the federal claim, a court may be warranted in treating it so.' This treat-
ment depends on the strength of the policy of avoiding constitutional or
federal adjudication.19
Cases in which no claim based on state law is made, though such a claim
could be made, are more problematic.192 In such cases the question is
whether a federal court may, sua sponte, determine that relief may be
had without resort to federal law, despite the absence of other than federal
claims, and remit the case to state court. In cases in which a potential
state ground which was not contained in the pleadings is predicate rather
than parallel to the alleged federal claim the answer should be in the af-
firmative, for in such cases the federal court may be entirely without
jurisdiction. For example, a case challenging the validity of a state statute
on federal constitutional grounds, with no accompanying claims for relief
under state law, may nevertheless be appropriate for abstention if the
applicability of the statute to the challenging party is questionable. If the
statute does not apply to the federal plaintiff as a matter of state law,
that plaintiff cannot be injured by it and thus may lack standing to
I" E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 140 n.3 (1970) (delay); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964) (same); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958) (same).
But see Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942). The problem of delay becomes
of particular significance when it may itself prejudice the federal interest sought to be vin-
dicated. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528 (1965); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Finally, though perhaps related
to the factor of delay, the invocation of federal judicial power for the protection of certain
interests is an additional factor in the abstention decision. E.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 628 (1974) (dictum); Field, supra note 184, at
1129-34. See also Shoenfeld, supra note 184, noting the then trend against abstention in civil
liberties cases. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (scope
of presumption of constitutionality of legislation is narrower when wording of legislation
appears to violate specific provision of Constitution).
I" E.g., Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975); Reetz v. Bozanich,
397 U.S. 82 (1970).
"I Commentators have suggested, however, that abstention is not proper for the parallel
claim, at least if avoidance of duplication of effort is the goal. Field, supra note 184, at 1099
nn.108 & 111; Note, Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine, supra note 161, at 616-17. They reason
that if such cases involve a state constitutional provision that is identical to a federal one,
and is so interpreted, then the state decision is necessarily a decision on a federal issue.
Cf. cases cited note 24 supra (state incorporation of federal law). But cf., e.g., Jankovich
v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965) (such provision is adequate and indepen-
dent state ground).
" Note 117 & accompanying text supra.
E.g., Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (per curiam); Boehning v. Indiana State
Employees Ass'n, 423 U.S. 6 (1975) (per curiam); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMillan, 406
U.S. 498 (1972); see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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challenge its constitutionality. In the absence of standing the federal court
would be without power to proceed. Consequently, as with other ques-
tions of subject matter jurisdiction, ' the federal court should consider
sua sponte the effect of the predicate nonfederal ground even in the
absence of a claim for relief based thereon.
This situation should be contrasted with the assertion of appellate
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court over the decisions of state courts."'
If the state court's determination is unambiguously based on federal
grounds, there can be no predicate nonfederal ground, though the state
court could have chosen nonfederal bases of decision. '95 For example, the
Supreme Court is not without jurisdiction to review on constitutional
grounds a state criminal conviction because the defendant might have
claimed that the statute he was convicted of violating was, as a matter
of state law, inapplicable to him. That defense, while perhaps originally
available, is no longer cognizable. The state seems to have taken the posi-
tion that the statute did apply to the defendant's activities.'9 By failing
to challenge that position, the defendant has conceded its validity.
Moreover, the state court, by entering a judgment of conviction, has
necessarily, though implicitly, so held. In the typical case involving the
invocation of original jurisdiction, if the applicability of the state statute
to the federal plaintiff is unclear, his failure to raise that ought not to
preclude the federal court from considering it sua sponte, for the state
may not attempt to apply the challenged statute to the federal plaintiff."
In cases in which it is clear that any predicate state law issue will be
resolved in a manner requiring adjudication of the federal issue, however,
abstention would be inappropriate. 9'
Cases in which a potential state law ground which is not pleaded is
parallel rather than predicate to the alleged federal claim present greater
difficulty."9 Again, the typical case might involve a challenge to a state
statute on only federal constitutional grounds. The federal court may
determine that the validity of the statute on state constitutional grounds
E.g., Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). See generally note 243 infra.
See notes 15-66 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 44-54 & accompanying text supra.
See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474 (1975).
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971); cf. International Longshoremen's
Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954) (determining validity of legislation before it adversely
affects individual is improper exercise of judicial function).
I" E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (dictum) ("If [plaintiffs] had alleged that
they would be prosecuted for the conduct they planned to engage in, and if the District
Court had found this allegation to be true ... then a genuine controversy might be said
to exist.").
I" See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467 (1973)
(per curiam); Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam) (another case pending
in state court attacking same statute as violative of state constitution; district court asked
to abstain).
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is questionable, despite the failure of the plaintiff so to allege. Whether
the federal court should adjudicate the constitutional question in such a
case depends upon whether the policy of avoiding constitutional adjudica-
tion outweighs the plaintiff's election of a federal rather than a state
claim.03 The question is whether a plaintiff is entitled to waive all but
his federal claims2"' or whether all claims for relief under state law must
be exhausted before a plaintiff will be permitted to resort to a federal
forum for adjudication of the federal claim. The answer may depend upon
the intimacy of the relationship between the federal claims and exercises
of state sovereign power or concern for important state interests."' If an
immediate adjudication of a claimed federal right would interfere with
the state's administration of its criminal laws, the integrity of its welfare
system,"" a detailed administrative program,2 5 the regulation of scarce
natural resourcesm or a state tax system,m federal reluctance to intervene
might be expected.00 If, however, there will be significant injury to the
alleged federal right in the absence of immediate federal intervention, the
court may well overcome its reluctance.2 9 The calculus of interests is
similar to that governing the abstention question generally.20
In any event, the circumstances in which it is most clear that it is pro-
per for the federal court to remit the case to state court are those cases
in which one count of the plaintiffs complaint-that based on state law
(for example, the inapplicability of the challenged statute)- denies the
power of the federal court to adjudicate the case. Although the validity
of pleading alternative, even inconsistent, grounds of relief211 is not here
See notes 51 & 117 supra.
2*1 See notes 51 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 142 & 173 & accompanying text supra.
E.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977).
2* Cf. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (dismissal); Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (same).
I" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 (1948); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huff-
man, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
"' See notes 142 & 173 supra.
20 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975) (pretrial incarceration); Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (biased state tribunal); cf. Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651, 659-62 (1977) (motion to dismiss indictment on double jeopardy ground appealable
final order); Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973) (pretrial habeas available on double
jeopardy claim).
2"0 See notes 184-88 & accompanying text supra. Cf Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437 (3d
Cir. 1975) (doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and exhaustion requirement
for pretrial habeas essentially the same).
2l E.g., Little v. Texaco, Inc., 456 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1972); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Par-
sons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1970); General Guar. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans Gen.
Agency, Inc., 427 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1970); Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 324
F.2d 74, 76 (10th Cir. 1963) (dictum); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2); see S. COHN, THE COMMON LAW
FOUNDATIONS OF CIvIL PROCEDURE 60-61 (1971) (inconsistent pleading allowed at common law).
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challenged, it is submitted that a theory of relief which denies the basis
of the court's power to proceed based on the face of the complaint justifies
the court's refusal to adjudicate the case unless and until jurisdiction has
been demonstrated. 12 The rule has been that unless the basis of jurisdic-
tion affirmatively appears on the face of the complaint a federal court is
without power to proceed.1' It also has been held214 that the later
emergence of a federal ground of decision will not cure the original defect.
The next section is an examination of that rule and its implications for
the theory of this article.
THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE, FEDERAL DEFENSE
REMOVAL AND THE POTENTIAL NONFEDERAL GROUND
For a party to invoke the original arising under jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the federal matter upon which the jurisdiction is based must
appear on the face of the plaintiff s well-pleaded complaint. 15 It is obvious
that if the complaint relies wholly on nonfederal matter, the case cannot
be one arising under federal law. It is somewhat less obvious, but equally
true, that if the complaint implicates federal matter unnecessary to plain-
tiffs claim, the federal matter is to be disregarded in determining the
jurisdictional question. It is plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, rather than
the complaint actually filed, on which the determination of jurisdiction
is to be made. Allegations that defendant will rely on federal matter"'
or that plaintiff will rely on federal matter in reply to an anticipated
defense"7 are insufficient to confer jurisdiction. If reliance on federal mat-
ter is not necessary to entitle the pleader to relief, the case is not one
arising under federal law."8
212 See Dobbs, supra note 126, at 507-21.
212 E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
214 E.g., id.
211 Id.; C. WRIGHT, supra note 33, at S 18.
21 E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974) (per curiam); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (statute barring free passes).
217 E.g., Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908) (statute unconstitutional); see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661 (1974) (noncompliance with federal treaty and statute, asserted in reply to anticipated
defense; jurisdiction upheld on basis of other federal question).
218 Compare Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917) (jurisdiction to remove cloud on title
because necessary to allege federal invalidity of defendant's claim), with Marshall v. Desert
Properties Co., 103 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 563 (1939) (no jurisdiction to
quiet title because federal nature of adverse claim need not be pleaded). But see Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606 (1897) (defendant's right to removal on federal question not
defeated by plaintiff's pleading errors).
The well-pleaded complaint rule has presented especially difficult problems in suits for
declaratory judgments. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
The difficulty stems from the notion that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2201
(1976), "is procedural only," Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), and
was not intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, if the declaratory
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Although not the source of the rule,219 the case most frequently cited
in support of it is Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley.22 The now
familiar tale began in 1871 with the Mottleys' receipt of a free pass,
renewable annually during their lives, from the Louisville & Nashville
Railroad in settlement of a tort claim. In 1906 Congress enacted a statute
that forebade free passes."' On January 1, 1907, the railroad refused to
renew the passes and the Mottleys brought suit in federal court. Their
complaint alleged that the railroad had breached its agreement with them
in reliance on the federal statute, that the statute was inapplicable and
that, if the statute did apply, it unconstitutionally impaired the obliga-
tion of contract. The litigants raised no jurisdictional issues. The trial court
found for the Mottleys and the railroad sought review in the Supreme
Court.
The Court, raising the issue sua sponte, held federal jurisdiction
lacking.' Despite the presence in the case of two questions of federal law
that had been fully litigated below, the case did not arise under that law
because "[ilt is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated
defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated
by some provision of the Constitution of the United States."' "[A] suit
arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when
the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based
plaintiff could not have initiated an action absent the Declaratory Judgment Act-for ex-
ample, where he seeks a declaration of the validity of a federal defense to an anticipated
action-jurisdiction is problematic. The leading case on the question, Skelly Oil, does little
to resolve the difficulties. In that case it is unclear whether the Court held that jurisdic-
tion is to be determined on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint for declaratory relief
or the well-pleaded hypothetical complaint for coercive relief, although most authorities
have interpreted the case as requiring the latter. E.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 75, at 170;
10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 2767 (1973); Cohen, supra
note 76, at 894 n.26; Currie, supra note 76, at 269-70; Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction
and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REv. 445,465-68 (1954). But see 6A J. MOORE FEDERAL
PRACTICE 57.23 (2d ed. 1980). Language in Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
248 (1952), supports this construction. To make matters more obscure, it is uncertain in
Skelly Oil that either complaint, properly analyzed, relied or would rely on federal matter.
See Cohen, supra note 76, at 909-10; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 183-84; Trautman, supra, at
466-67.
The question is one of the proper interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act: there
is no constitutional difficulty with predicating jurisdiction on the allegations of the well-
pleaded complaint for declaratory relief for the same reasons that there is no constitutional
infirmity in permitting a defendant to remove a case from state to federal court based upon
a defense which relies upon federal matter, see notes 232-36 & accompanying text infra.
Moreover, in terms of public policy, all of the reasons supporting federal defense removal
are applicable here. See notes 237-39 & accompanying text infra. A thorough discussion of
the problem is beyond the scope of this article.
219 See note 226 & accompanying text infra.
211 U.S. 149 (1908).
22 Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified at 49 U.S.C. S 1(7) (1976)).
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
Id. at 152.
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upon those laws or that Constitution." Perhaps because of the subse-
quent history of the litigation between the Mottleys and the railroad,5
the case appears to present the well-pleaded complaint rule as an ineffi-
cient and capricious limitation on the exercise of federal judicial power.
The Court offered no analysis of or justification for the rule; it simply
announced it as "the settled interpretation" and applied it, citing a dozen
and a half cases in support. 6
2' Id.
Part of the irony of the case is that the Supreme Court ultimately decided the federal
issues on the merits, Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). After the Court's
jurisdictional dismissal, plaintiffs brought their suit in state court. The railroad made the
expected federal defense and the Mottleys the expected federal reply. The state courts
rendered judgment for the Mottleys, 133 Ky. 652, 118 S.W. 982 (1909), as had the original
federal trial court, 150 F. 406 (C.C.W.D. Ky. 1907). The Supreme Court reversed, deciding
the federal issues in favor of the railroad.
' 211 U.S. at 154. The Court relied principally on Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank,
152 U.S. 454 (1894), a case more significant for its application of the rule to the problem
of removal jurisdiction, see notes 232-36 infra.
The rule's source is to be found in the opinion of the first Justice Harlan in Metcalf v.
Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888). Plaintiff had brought suit in a Wisconsin federal court as
assignee of a federal judgment. The defense was the Wisconsin statute of limitations, Wis.
Rev. Stat., ch. 138, §§ 1, 14, 15, 16 (1858); Wis. Rev. Stat., ch. 177, §§ 4206, 4219, 4220, 4221
(1878), which provided a 10-year period within which an action to enforce a judgment of
any state or federal court was to be brought and a 20-year period for such suits if founded
on a judgment rendered by a Wisconsin state court of record. Plaintiff contended that it
was beyond the constitutional power of the state to provide a shorter limitation period for
federal judgments than for the judgments of its own courts. The Court held the case not
within the arising under jurisdiction. That the judgment sought to be enforced had been
rendered by a federal court was found insufficient to make the suit one arising under federal
law. Cf. Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.
1978) (no jurisdiction to enforce agreement settling federal case). But cf. Aro Corp. v. Allied
Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir.) (jurisdiction to enforce agreement settling federal case),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). The judgment was characterized as "an ordinary right of
property" the source of which was irrelevant to plaintiffs claim. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1976)
(federal incorporation of party insufficient to sustain jurisdiction). But cf. Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (federal incorporation sufficient under Con-
stitution to sustain jurisdiction of case in which corporation is party); notes 101-09 & ac-
companying text supra. Moreover, Justice Harlan distinguished the cases that had upheld
jurisdiction on the basis of federal matter raised for the first time by way of defense on
the ground that they were all cases in which jurisdiction was sought through removal. 128
U.S. at 589.
Eight of the other cases cited in Mottley dealt with original jurisdiction, either directly
or in the context of Supreme Court review of the decisions of the courts of appeals, and
eight dealt with removal. Of particular interest, in light of the federal interests clearly pre-
sent, are two removal cases, Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102 (1894), and Walker v.
Collins, 167 U.S. 57 (1897). They are among the more extreme examples of the operation
of the well-pleaded complaint rule to preclude federal jurisdiction of cases that clearly belong
in federal courts.
Chappell was an ejectment action brought in Maryland state court for possession of land
located on the Patapsco River. The defendant, Waterworth, was in possession of a portion
of the land claimed by plaintiff as the keeper of a lighthouse built by the federal govern-
ment, and his defense to the action was that the land was owned by the United States.
The Court held removal improper, relying on Union & Planters' Bank, because the com-
plaint was framed as an ordinary ejectment action between individuals, showing neither
a right claimed by either party under federal law nor a claim by the United States or any
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Analytically, a rule denying federal judicial power unless the need for
its exercise is demonstrable at the time jurisdiction is sought to be in-
voked follows from the purposes underlying the limitations on federal
jurisdiction.'7 In cases in which the plaintiff seeks to invoke federal
jurisdiction to litigate a claim for relief founded entirely on nonfederal
bases, the prediction of the necessity for relying on federal matter can
be made with certainty as of the time the jurisdictional determination must
be made; no federal matter can form a ground for decision. When a plain-
tiff merely anticipates a federal defense, there is no federal matter in-
volved in the case at the time the jurisdiction is sought to be invoked.
If the defendant does not answer and a default judgment is rendered,
reversal would be required because the record shows a lack of jurisdic-
tion to render any judgment.' Until it can be demonstrated that federal
matter must be relied upon in disposing of the case, the court lacks power
even to compel an answer.
Thus, it would seem that in Mottley the plaintiffs' lack of reliance on
any federal matter should have resulted in the jurisdictional dismissal of
their complaint, for under any view of the case the court lacked power
to proceed on the basis of that complaint. It has been suggested, however,
that by the time the jurisdictional issue was raised and decided, it was
clear that the critical questions in the case were entirely matters of federal
concern, and that the original jurisdictional defect should have been held
cured by the subsequent reliance of both parties on federal matter.' This
position appeals to efficiency, but is difficult to reconcile with judicial pro-
nouncements on the question.' Nevertheless, the obvious benefits of such
a result make it worth achieving in the absence of some constitutional
bar. There is scholarly support for the proposition that no such bar
exists;23 ' analytical support for the validity of that proposition is
overwhelming.
third party to rights in the land. 155 U.S. at 107.
Walker was an action for unlawful seizure of goods. Defendants were the United States
Marshal and deputy marshals for the District of Kansas; their defense was that the seizure
was made on an attachment issued by the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas. Relying
on Chappell, the Court held removal improper, 167 U.S. at 59, even though after the state
court's initial denial of defendants' removal petition, the plaintiff had joined in the request
for removal. The case seems more compelling than Chappell, in which, if the identity of
the landowner is ignored, only issues of state real property law were involved.
See note 243 & accompanying text infra.
' Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589-90 (1888).
Chadbourn & Levine, supra note 76, at 665; see Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REv. 73, 76-84 (1950). But see C. WRIGHT, supra. note 33, S 18, at
69; Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L. REv. 17,43-44 (1947);
Cohen, supra note 76, at 894; Comment, Proposed Revision of Federal Question Jurisdiction,
40 ILL. L. REv. 387, 399 (1945).
1' ALI STUDY, supra note 75, at 190; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 164; see C. WRIGHT. supra
note 33, S 18, at 69.
,' See, e.g., 1A J. MOORE. FEDERAL PRACTICE .160, at 184 n.12 (2d ed. 1981); Chadbourn
& Levine, supra note 76, at 665; Fraser, supra note 229, at 76-81.
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The starting point of analysis is the constitutional propriety of federal
defense removal. The Court in Tennessee v. Union & Planters'Banks held,
over Justice Harlan's dissent, that a defendant was precluded by statute'
from removing a case from state to federal court on the basis of federal
matter properly raised for the first time as a defense to a plaintiff's state
law claim for relief. There was no suggestion that the decision rested on
the Constitution.' Prior to the passage of the statute, the effect of which
152 U.S. 454 (1894).
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552.
Even with respect to the statutory question, the majority's position is less than com-
pelling. Justice Harlan, the author of the opinion in Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586
(1888), which formed the basis of the decision in Union & Planters' Bank, agreed that federal
matter raised in defense could not support original jurisdiction, but dissented from that
portion of the decision that construed the removal statute to preclude removal jurisdiction
based on a federal defense. Prior to the decision in Union & Planters' Bank, Congress had
amended the jurisdictional statute, Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552. Under the
amendment the jurisdictional amount necessary to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts was raised to $2,000. The section relevant to removal jurisdiction provided
that any suit arising under federal law of which there was original jurisdiction was removable.
Because plaintiffs were not entitled to invoke original federal jurisdiction on the basis of
an anticipated federal defense, the majority concluded that federal matter raised in defense
could not support original arising under jurisdiction and hence could not support removal
jurisdiction. Justice Harlan (with whom Justice Field joined) construed the removal statute
to prohibit federal defense removal only in cases that did not meet the new jurisdictional
amount requirement; that is, he read the phrase permitting removal of cases "arising under
[federal law] of which the ... Courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction"
to permit removal of cases arising under federal law at the time removal was sought because
of federal matter raised by the removing defendant, in which the value of the matter in
dispute was sufficient to confer original jurisdiction.
The legislative history of the statute is sketchy, and it is unclear whether Congress in-
tended to change existing law on federal defense removal, except by restricting removal
to defendants. The statute was passed by the 49th Congress on March 3, 1887, the last
day of the final legislative session, and amended to correct punctuation errors in Act of
August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. The legislation was introduced in the House by
Representative David B. Culberson of Texas, who had introduced similar legislation in the
three previous Congresses. The bill introduced provided that suits arising under federal
law of which the circuit courts had original jurisdiction could be removed by a defendant
from state court whenever it appeared from his petition that "his... defense depends in
whole or in part upon a correct construction of some provision of the Constitution or law
of the United States." Of this provision Representative Culberson said,
The bill further provides that wherever the cause of action arises under the
Constitution of the United States, or a law or treaty thereof, the defendant
who is sued in a State court upon such a cause of action may remove the cause
to a Federal court, provided he shall make it appear to the court in which the
case is pending that his defense depends upon a proper construction of the
Constitution of the United States, or some law or treaty thereof.
18 CONG. REc. 614 (1887). Although the language of the statute refers to a suit arising under
federal law, Representative Culberson's remarks would indicate that removal was to be
permitted only when plaintiff's claim (if cause of action is a term of art and not merely
a synonym for case) involved a federal question and the defendant's defense did as well.
Without further clarification, this language would seem to contemplate removal when the
defense depends on construction of the federal law on which plaintiffs claim is based or
when the defense depends on construction of a federal law other than the one on which
plaintiff's claim is based.
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was at issue in the case, federal defense removal was granted routinely.
Support for the position that the bill was not intended to do away with federal defense
removal can be derived from the fact that neither the House Judiciary Committee nor
Representative Culberson, in summarizing the major changes in existing law effected by
the bill, noted a change in that respect. H.R. REP. No. 1078, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
Representative Culberson's remarks in connection with S 10 of the bill, which repealed
S 640 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, ch. 7, S 640, 18 Stat. 114 (1874), also
support this view. Section 640 permitted a federally chartered corporation to remove a case
from state court upon its suggestion that its defense arose under federal law. The problem
sought to be corrected was that the incorporation statute had been interpreted to provide
a sufficient basis for removal, although all issues to be decided in the case were ones of
state law. The repeal did not, according to Representative Culberson, foreclose a federal
corporation's removal on the basis of any federal defense, for it provided, "whenever a cor-
poration, or any one else, is sued in a State court and the defense of such corporation or
individual depends upon a right construction of the laws of Congress, or of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, then such cause may be removed." 18 CONG. REC. 614 (1887).
In House proceedings on two prior versions of the bill, in both of which the pertinent
language was identical to the one finally passed in 1887, the same point was made as to
repeal of the federal corporation removal provision, see 10 CONG. REC. 723 (1880) (remarks
of Rep. Willits); id. at 724 (remarks of Rep. Culberson); id. at 814 (remarks of Rep. New);
14 id. at 1248 (1883) (remarks of Rep. Culberson); but the same "cause of action" language
was also used in connection with one version, id. at 1247-48 (remarks of Rep. Culberson).
Proceedings in the Senate shed no additional light on interpretation of the 1887 act. The
Senate Judiciary Committee made several changes in the House version, see 18 CoNG. REC.
2168 (1887), all of which were passed without discussion. Id. at 2542. The committee made
no written report. It would, for instance, be very helpful to know why the Senate deleted
"whenever it is made to appear from the application of such defendant or defendants that
his or their defense depends in whole or in part upon a correct construction of [federal law]"
from S 2. Id. at 2168. The deletion of the language precludes the interpretation, based on
the language alone, that the defendant could remove when plaintiff's claim was federal and
his defense was based on another federal law. It is the deleted language that supports the
idea that removal could be based on a federal defense, and it is that language to which
Representative Culberson was apparently referring in his statements that support federal
defense removal based on defendant's allegations. Moreover, the statute then in force, which
had been consistently interpreted as permitting federal defense removal, is consistent with
the deletion of this language. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
It seems that the phrase "of which the circuit courts are given original jurisdiction" in
the statute was intended to do no more than refer back to the jurisdictional amount in the
first section, but if the phrase "suits ... arising under" meant "cause of action" in the sense
of plaintiff's claim, the majority's interpretation of the statute as doing away with defense
removal is sound, particularly absent the language deleted by the Senate. But see Railroad
Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 142-43 (1880) (Miller, J., dissenting) (interpreting the word
"suit" in the prior statute to preclude federal defense removal). It is also possible, however,
particularly given Representative Culberson's other remarks, that he was using the phrase
"cause of action" to mean case or suit, rather than in the technical sense of elements of
plaintiff's claim. The Senate may have deleted the language in question either because it
thought it unnecessary or to avoid imposing a requirement that the defendant do more than
allege the federal defense in his petition for removal.
In any event, whatever may be said of who came closer to divining the "true" meaning
of the amendments, the statute read as a whole and in light of its legislative history will
bear the meaning imputed to it by Justice Harlan. As a matter of policy, that meaning is
far more agreeable than one that would deny a litigant access to a federal forum to vin-
dicate a federal right. ALI STUDY. supra note 75, at 188-89; Currie, supra note 76, at 270;
Fraser, supra note 229, at 78. Moreover, it may be that prohibiting removal based upon
a federal defense does nothing more than stimulate a race to the federal courthouse-at
least since enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2201 (Supp. II 1979).
If the party who would be the defendant in a coercive suit can obtain federal jurisdiction
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In Metcalf v. Watertoum,35 which established the well-pleaded complaint
rule, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, distinguished the cases cited
in support of upholding jurisdiction on the basis of a federal defense on
the ground that those cases were all instances of removal in which the
defendant sought to invoke the jurisdiction.18 The constitutional vitality
of those cases was not questioned. Thus, the case law supports the con-
stitutionality of federal defense removal.
Moreover, reason and policy strongly support permitting a defendant
to invoke federal jurisdiction to litigate a defense that rests on federal
law. The existing law allows a plaintiff to invoke jurisdiction based upon
his own federal claim; it does not permit the plaintiff to invoke jurisdic-
tion based upon the adverse party's anticipated defense. The defendant's
right to invoke jurisdiction through removal stands common sense on its
head: A defendant may remove a case from state to federal court only
if the case originally was cognizable there. The effect is to permit a defend-
ant to invoke the jurisdiction based upon the federal nature of plain-
tiff's claim, while denying him the right to invoke the jurisdiction on the
basis of the federal nature of his own defense to that claim. Surely it makes
far greater sense to allow the party seeking the federal adjudication to
invoke the power of the federal courts based upon his reliance on federal
matter.17 Many commentators have supported such a positionm and the
as a declaratory plaintiff seeking a declaration of the validity of his or her defense, but
cf. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (discussed in note 218 supra)
(well-pleaded complaint rule apparently applied to hypothetical complaint for coercive relief),
it makes little sense to preclude that party from invoking the jurisdiction when the coer-
cive lawsuit establishes the necessity for litigating the defense. Finally, the difficulty of
interpreting the Declaratory Judgment Act in pari materia with the jurisdictional statute
vanishes once it is seen that a federal defense may be a sufficient basis for invoking federal
jurisdiction, see note 237 infra.
128 U.S. 586 (1888).
Id. at 589.
This position also resolves the difficulty, posed by enactment of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2201 (Supp. II 1979), that the Court believed was presented by Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), see note 218 supra. One reading of
the case would require that federal jurisdiction over a suit for declaratory relief be deter-
mined on the basis of the hypothetical complaint for coercive relief in order to avoid ex-
panding federal jurisdiction. If, however, either party to the litigation may invoke the federal
judicial power based upon his own reliance on federal matter, a court need not seek to deter-
mine whether any of the elements of a hypothetical complaint for coercive relief rests on
federal matter. If the hypothetical coercive defendant may invoke the jurisdiction on the
basis of a federal defense, it would be immaterial that he does so in the first instance as
a declaratory plaintiff. A court would need to look only to the declaratory complaint ac-
tually filed in making the jurisdictional determination. The potential "race to the courthouse"
that might otherwise result from determining jurisdiction on the basis of the allegations
of the actual declaratory complaint without providing for federal defense removal would
be eliminated. See notes 218 & 234 supra.
' Chadbourn & Levine, supra note 76, at 673; Fraser, supra note 229, at 82-84; Wechsler,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216,
233-34 (1948); see ALI STUDY. supra note 75, at 191-92; 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 75, .160, at 184 n.12; Comment, supra note 229, at 399.
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American Law Institute agrees, at least in part."9
Once the defendant's right to invoke the federal judicial power on the
basis of the defensive use of federal matter is established, it is easy to
conclude that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on facts
such as those in Mottley is inappropriate. The jurisdictional dismissal in
Mottley occurred through the sua sponte action of an appellate court after
the railroad's federal defense had been raised and adjudicated in the lower
federal courts. It appears that both the defendant and the plaintiff desired
a federal adjudication; at least one may infer from defendant's failure to
object to the court's assertion of jurisdiction that it was not dissatisfied
with it.
The parties to a case cannot waive defects in subject matter
jurisdiction.u" A court of original jurisdiction should retain the power to
dismiss a case on its own motion where the well-pleaded complaint does
not reveal that the case arises under federal law. Of course, such a case
should be dismissed on defendant's motion. The power should not survive
a defendant's election of the federal forum based upon a federal defense.
That is, in cases in which the court has not ordered a jurisdictional
dismissal and the defendant answers raising a federal defense and elect-
ing the federal forum, the original jurisdictional defect should be held
cured. To do otherwise (again, assuming the propriety of federal defense
m9 ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS SS
1311, 1312 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968). See generally Currie, supra note 76, at 271-74.
"0 "[T]he judicial power of the United States must not be exerted in a case to which it
does not extend, even if both parties desire to have it exerted:' Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry.
v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 384 (1884); see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523 (1966) (dictum)
(Supreme Court jurisdiction); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939) (removal); Mitch-
ell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (original jurisdiction); New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 66 (1928) (dictum) (Supreme Court jurisdiction); cf. Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975) (mootness); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55 (1963)
(three-judge court). But see Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971); cf. City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Invest-
ment Co., 277 U.S. 54, 59 (1928) (parties cannot confer jurisdiction; "[y]et the action of the
party in acquiescing may strengthen inferences of necessary facts from the record to sus-
tain the jurisdiction, in the absence of a showing to the contrary").
Nor is a party, by asserting jurisdiction, estopped from later denying it. American Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
But see Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206 (1900); DiFrischia v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141
(3d Cir. 1960).
On the other hand, a party may admit a fact upon the existence of which subject matter
jurisdiction depends. Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 89 U.S. (22 Wal.) 322, 327 (1874); The Con-
fiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92, 108 (1873) (alternative holding); cf. California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 112 n.3 (1972) (pretrial stipulation by declaratory plaintiffs that they had of-
fered performances proscribed by challenged liquor board rules and by board that it would
take disciplinary action against violators; later stipulation of intent to enforce sufficient
for present and concrete controversy within meaning of statute and Constitution).
Two bases underlie the notion that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by
consent. The first, applicable to all courts, is historical fetishism, see Dobbs, The Decline
of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REV. 49 (1961). The second, limited to the federal courts,
is based upon the relationship of the states to the national union, see note 243 infra.
1981]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
removal) would lead to a bizzare scenario: first, plaintiff files a complaint
in federal court raising no federal matter but anticipating a federal
defense; second, defendant answers, raises the anticipated defense, does
not move to dismiss but elects to proceed in the federal forum; third, later
in the litigation -perhaps as late as appellate review after full initial
adjudication -the case is dismissed because plaintiffs complaint does not
rest on federal matter; fourth, plaintiff refiles his complaint in state court;
fifth, defendant answers making the same federal defense and removes
the case to federal court which now has jurisdiction. The federal court
must relitigate the matter since res judicata is inapplicable to prior pro-
ceedings over which the original tribunal lacked jurisdiction.24 Such a
course is manifest nonsense.242
The federal court has constitutional power to adjudicate the federal
defense. The plaintiff simply does not have the right to compel the defen-
dant to submit to the exercise of that power. Consequently, the purpose
of treating subject matter jurisdiction as "nonwaivable" is not applicable.'
The issue is analogous to questions of personal jurisdiction'44 or venue245
241 Aspden v. Nixon, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 467 (1846) (alternative holding); see Montgomery v.
Samory, 99 U.S. 482, 488 (1878) (applying Louisiana law); Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
109, 113-14 (1821) (general rule stated; court rendering prior adjudication found to have had
jurisdiction).
2 A similar anomaly exists under present law. In cases exclusively within the federaljurisdiction but erroneously brought by a plaintiff in state court, a defendant's petition for
removal to federal court will be denied. Though the case is exclusively within federal com-
petence, the federal court is said to have no jurisdiction. The rationale is that removaljurisdiction is derivative; if the state court lacked jurisdiction, the federal court to which
removal is sought cannot obtain jurisdiction. This is so even if the reason the state court
lacked power is that only the federal court possessed such power. See Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939); General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261,
288 (1922); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
" The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction for the same reason that congres-
sional power is limited: to protect the states from national incursion on their sovereignty.
See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401 (1856); id. at 566 (Curtis, J., dissent-
ing); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton); Note, supra note 113, at 654; cf. Dobbs, supra note
126, at 529 (insulting for federal courts to try cases belonging to state courts). Because the
interest of state sovereignty in a federated union is the object of the protection afforded
by jurisdictional limitations, cf. Ohio Bureau of Emp. Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80
(1977) (state's legitimate activities may not be unduly interfered with), it would be irrational
to permit private litigants to thwart those limitations by agreement. In cases in which the
consenting party is not the beneficiary of the protection he or she is attempting to waive,
waiver is not permitted. Cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356, 358 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (parties should not be permitted to thwart state's interest in marriage rela-
tionship by consensual divorce in different jurisdiction).
In cases in which legitimate state power would not be imperiled, the reason underlying
the notion of nonwaivability is inapplicable, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. But cf.
Currie, supra note 187; Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part
, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (three-judge court, where required, is matter of subject matter jurisdic-
tion not waivable by state).
244 E.g., Alger v. Hayes, 452 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1972); Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56
(3d Cir. 1969); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
245 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Commercial Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929; General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore &
M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
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and should be similarly treated.24 If the party with the right to call upon
the federal judicial machinery to resolve a dispute within its competence
desires or is satisfied with a federal forum, the adverse party's making
the initial demand ought not to preclude the assertion of jurisdiction.
Thus far the analysis has proceeded from removal jurisdiction on the
basis of a federal defense to invocation of the jurisdiction on the basis
of that defense under circumstances in which the defendant could not be
compelled to litigate in a federal forum. It is a short step from that no-
tion to one precluding an appellate court from raising the issue of jurisdic-
tion in cases like Mottley. Given the recognition that a defendant relying
on federal law may choose either a state or federal forum, one need only
draw the implication from silence to acquiescence.247 That implication is
easier to draw here than in most instances in which a party is bound to
a particular decision by silence. Many, if not most, litigants presented with
the choice of a federal or state forum choose the former.248 This is even
more likely to be true for litigants relying on federal law; the federal courts
presumably would be more sympathetic to such claims or defenses.249 The
policy against relitigation and favoring conservation of scarce judicial
resources applies here. Indeed, it may apply with even greater force since
relitigation may take place in the very same forum if the validity of federal
defense removal is recognized. °
If federal matter relied upon by a litigant does not depend upon the
establishment of some predicate nonfederal matter, the constitutional de-
mand that the case arise under federal law is satisfied. When a defen-
dant relies on federal law to resist on the merits a claim under state law,
federal matter is introduced that is not predicated on the establishment
of nonfederal bases. The pleadings of the parties frame the issues on which
the trial will proceed; this is the reason for the well-pleaded complaint
rule. Disregarding dilatory pleas," ' a defendant's plea to the merits may
246 See note 46 & accompanying text supra.
247 See notes 46, 50 & 244-45 & accompanying text supra.
248 See generally Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diver-
sity Cases, 47 IowA L. REV. 933 (1962); Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in
Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REV. 178 (1965).
249 See note 165 & accompanying text supra. But cf. Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (noting that state courts' construc-
tion of state laws may extend greater protection to the citizen than the Supreme Court's
construction of federal law).
I See text accompanying note 241 supra. What is suggested here is not the complete
abrogation of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Such a suggestion would raise profound con-
stitutional difficulties for reasons advanced earlier, notes 228 & 243 & accompanying text
supra. Permitting a defendant to invoke federal jurisdiction by removal presents no such
constitutional difficulties; otherwise the Supreme Court might be incapable of reviewing
the decisions of state courts on questions of federal law that had not appeared at the outset
of the case-in the well-pleaded complaint; see notes 67-139 & accompanying text supra.
25 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have long departed from the common
law system of pleading, some matters raisable under rules 9 and 12(b), see FED. R. Civ. P.
9(a), 12(b)(1), (2) & (7), for example, would have been dilatory pleas. To the extent that rule
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take any of three forms:22 denial,25 I demurrer,M or confession and
avoidance."s Of these three pleas to the merits only one -confession and
avoidance -can introduce federal matter as a defense to a complaint wholly
based on state law. Neither the denial nor the demurrer raises any new
matter. If the complaint rests on state law, the denial challenges merely
the existence of the facts necessary to support the claim; the demurrer
challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint as a
matter of state law. An affirmative defense, on the other hand, does in-
troduce new matter into the case. If the defense is federal in nature, the
new matter introduced is federal and is sufficient, as a constitutional mat-
ter, to sustain removal if not predicated on nonfederal grounds.
Under such circumstances there is no nonfederal predicate which might
bar the invocation of jurisdiction. When the sole defense is a confession
and avoidance, the introduction of the federal avoidance does not depend
on the plaintiffs establishment of his prima facie case since that is ad-
mitted by that form of pleading. It is likely that in many cases a defen-
dant will not rely solely on a confession and avoidance defense. Often the
defendant may combine the affirmative federal defense with a denial of
allegations of the complaint or with a demurrer to those allegations or
both.' The appropriate resolution of the jurisdictional issue in those cases
should parallel that accorded the complaint that alleges both federal and
nonfederal grounds for relief;2 7 in effect the defendant has filed a multi-
count answer alleging parallel bases of defense. The defendant is entitled
to have one of those counts litigated in the federal courts; others are
beyond this entitlement.
Here, as with multicount complaints alleging parallel grounds for relief,
pendent jurisdiction supplies the analysis.' Given the defendant's right
to invoke federal judicial power to litigate the affirmative federal defense,
the federal court must either split the defenses -retaining jurisdiction
over the confession and avoidance while remanding the rest of the case
12(b) permits, although it does not require, id. 12(b); but cf. id. 12(g) (if motion made certain
defenses lost if not included), raising certain defenses by motion before answer, it bears
some remote resemblance to a dilatory plea-plea in bar system.
2 2 S. COHN, supra note 211, at 47; see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD. CIVIL PROCEDURE 127-29 (1977).
Despite the abrogation of common law pleading rules, the common law terminology is used
here for the sake of clarity and simplicity. The four common law pleas that may be made
by a defendant exhaust the field. Even under modern liberal pleading rules a defendant's
answer can be characterized as falling into one or more of these.
Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (federal equivalent of denial).
Cf. id. 12(b)(6) (federal equivalent of demurrer).
Cf. id. 8(c) (affirmative defenses).
The federal rules, for example, require that a defendant do so, id. 12(b), except to the
extent that a 12(b)(6) defense can be equated with a demurrer and can be raised by
preliminary motion, id.
.. See notes 112-17 & accompanying text supra.
' See notes 113-15 supra.
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to state court-or litigate the entire case in federal court.,-9 In cases in
which the principles of pendent jurisdiction support litigating the entire
case before one court, the nonfederal elements may be litigated in federal
court; one would expect that in the typical case defenses would satisfy
the test for exercising pendent jurisdiction.6 '
Finally, the affirmative defense itself may comprise federal and
nonfederal elements."' Invocation of jurisdiction should be permitted when
a plaintiff in similar circumstances would be permitted to invoke it.
Jurisdiction should be upheld when the federal component of the defense
is predicate to the nonfederal matter.' Jurisdiction is more complex when
nonfederal matter is predicate to federal. As the earlier discussion in-
dicated, the existence of jurisdiction is directly related to the probability
that the nonfederal matter will be determined in a way that requires the
court to reach the federal matter.2" As with the complaint containing a
federal claim predicated on nonfederal matter the validity of which is
uncertain, the court (properly or improperly) may proceed to decision of
the federal matter without an explicit determination of the preliminary
nonfederal matter;2 it may determine that the defendant seeking removal
has failed to establish as a matter of jurisdictional fact the nonfederal
elements on which the federal defense is predicated and deny removal;
25
or it may remand pending a binding determination by the state court of
the nonfederal matter.266 In short, the federal tribunal may treat the peti-
tion to remove based on a federal defense in the same way as it would
treat a plaintiffs complaint under similar circumstances. 1
CONCLUSION
All human knowledge is hierarchical in structure. Some concepts are
analytically antecedent to other concepts. Recognition of the former is re-
quired for legitimate use of the latter.2" Thus, as a body of knowledge,
law is hierarchical: Legal principles may range from primitive to
sophisticated, from basic to collateral, from fundamental to trivial.2 9
See note 116 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 112-17 supra.
26 See notes 100-39 & accompanying text supra.
26 See, e.g., Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248 (1885).
See text accompanying note 188 supra.
See notes 133-38 & accompanying text supra.
See note 128 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 130-32 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 126-39 & accompanying text supra.
' See H. HAZLITT, THINKING AS A SCIENCE 26 (1916).
' An example beyond those in the text is that a rule prohibiting the introduction of
hearsay evidence, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (1975), rests upon an elaborate body of antecedent
principles including the principle that evidence is required to decide certain questions. Failure
to recognize the concept "evidence" would render the concept of "hearsay" meaningless.
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This hierarchical structure is an attribute of legal principles and par-
ticular legal controversies as well. A court's decision on the merits of a
case requires an antecedent affirmation, explicit or implicit, of its power
to decide. The jurisdiction of a court is an element anterior to its con-
sideration, much less resolution, of a case before it."
Determining whether a particular case arises under federal law requires
analyzing the hierarchical structure of the elements of the case. If the
federal element is sufficiently anterior to the other elements in the case
so that decision of the merits requires reliance upon it, federal jurisdic-
tion exists. Failure to recognize the principle of analytic priorities and
to apply the structural analysis to which it leads to cases of questionable
federal jurisdiction has created obscurity and inconsistency in an area
of the law which should be characterized by clarity and simplicity.
21 E.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512 (1869); see Wheldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647 (1963). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In addition to
examples in the text, an instance of the hierarchy of claims is that a claim under the four-
teenth amendment requires a finding that the challenged action is attributable to the state
prior to consideration of the legitimacy of that action, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451-514 (1978).
The question of legitimacy must be predicated on a finding of state action.
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